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Freedom of Association
JOHN D. INAZU
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s categories of expressive and
intimate association first announced in the 1984 decision, Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, are neither well-settled nor defensible. These indefensible categories
matter deeply to groups that have sought to maintain an unpopular composition
and message in the face of antidiscrimination laws. These groups have been
denied associational protections. They have been forced to change their
composition—and therefore their message. They no longer exist in the form they
once held and desired to maintain.
The Roberts categories of intimate and expressive association are at least
partly to blame. These categories set in place a framework in which courts
sidestep the hard work of weighing the constitutional values that shape the laws
that bind us. This Article exposes the problems inherent in these categories and
calls for a meaningful constitutional inquiry into laws impinging upon group
autonomy. It suggests that the Court eliminate the categories of intimate and
expressive association and turn instead to the right of assembly. Our right to
assemble—to form relationships, to gather, to exist as groups of our choosing—is
fundamental to liberty and genuine pluralism.
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The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of
Freedom of Association
JOHN D. INAZU*
I. INTRODUCTION
The women’s soccer team at the University of North Carolina has won
twenty national championships, an achievement unmatched anywhere else
in amateur athletics. The LPGA hosts a women’s professional golf tour
with nationally televised tournaments and roughly fifty million dollars in
annual prize money. Music has thrived (or perhaps suffered, depending on
one’s perspective) with all-male groups like the Beatles, the Righteous
Brothers, and the Jonas Brothers, and all-female groups like the Pointer
Sisters, the Indigo Girls, and the Dixie Chicks. All-black choirs perform
gospel music, and the Mormon Tabernacle Choir consists of, well,
Mormons. The Talmudical Institute of Upstate New York, the Holy
Trinity Orthodox Seminary (Russian Orthodox), and Morehouse College
admit only men to their programs; Barnard College, Bryn Mawr College,
and Wellesley College admit only women. During the women’s
movement in the early twentieth century, women organized around banner
meetings, balls, swimming races, potato-sack races, baby shows, meals,
pageants, and teatimes.1 Gay organizations “‘have relied on exclusively
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to Rick Garnett, Bill
Marshall, Rob Vischer, Bob Cochran, Guy-Uriel Charles, Jeff Powell, Neil Siegel, Jonathan Mitchell,
Jeff Spinner-Halev, Mike Lienesch, Susan Bickford, Stanley Hauerwas, Amin Aminfar, Max Eichner,
Sara Beale, James Boyle, David Lange, Allen Buchanan, Joseph Blocher, Curt Bradley, Sam Buell,
Nathan Chapman, Steve Smith, Lawrence Solum, Andy Koppelman, Eugene Volokh, Jed Purdy, Stuart
Benjamin, and participants at the faculty workshop at Duke Law School for helpful comments on
earlier versions of this article. Thanks also to Jenna Snow and her colleagues at the Connecticut Law
Review. Some of the arguments in this Article are summarized in the Amicus Brief of Pacific Justice
Institute and Christian Service Charities in Support of Petitioner Christian Legal Society in Christian
Legal Society v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1371), cert. granted, Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 795 (2009), aff’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). The author
participated in the preparation of that brief (with Peter Lepiscopo).
1
LINDA LUMSDEN, RAMPANT WOMEN: SUFFRAGISTS AND THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY 3 (1997).
Lumsden has suggested that “virtually the entire suffrage story can be told through the prism of the
right of assembly.” Id. at 144. Iris Marion Young has argued that:
[Female separatism] promoted the empowerment of women through selforganization, the creation of separate and safe spaces where women could share and
analyze their experiences, voice their anger, play with and create bonds with one
another, and develop new and better institutions and practices.
Most elements of the contemporary women’s movement have been separatist to
some degree. Separatists seeking to live as much of their lives as possible in
women-only institutions were largely responsible for the creation of the women’s
culture that burst forth all over the United States by the mid 1970s, and continues to
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gay environments in which to feel safe, to build relationships, and to
develop political strategy,’” including “many exclusively gay social and
activity clubs, retreats, vacations, and professional organizations.”2
Sometimes discrimination is a good thing.
Of course, discrimination also has its costs. Those excluded—the Salt
Lake City atheist with perfect pitch, the male golfer with limited swing
velocity but machine-like precision—are denied opportunities, privileges,
and relationships they might have otherwise had. They may be harmed
economically, socially, and psychologically.3 When groups exclude based
upon characteristics like race, gender, or sexual orientation, the
psychological harm of exclusion may also extend well beyond those who
have actually sought acceptance to others who share their characteristics.
For all of these reasons, there is much to be said for an antidiscrimination
norm and the value of equality that underlies it.
But our constitutionalism also includes values other than equality,

claim the loyalty of millions of women—in the form of music, poetry, spirituality,
literature, celebrations, festivals, and dances. Whether drawing on images of
Amazonian grandeur, recovering and revaluing traditional women’s arts, like
quilting and weaving, or inventing new rituals based on medieval witchcraft, the
development of such expressions of women’s culture gave many feminists images of
a female-centered beauty and strength entirely outside capitalist patriarchal
definitions of feminine pulchritude. The separatist impulse also fostered the
development of the many autonomous women’s institutions and services that have
concretely improved the lives of many women, whether feminists or not—such as
health clinics, battered women’s shelters, rape crisis centers, and women’s
coffeehouses and bookstores.
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 161–62 (1990) (internal citation
omitted).
2
Brief of Gays & Lesbians for Individual Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11,
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371) [hereinafter Brief in Support
of Petitioner] (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a history of the early gay
rights movement and its reliance on freedom of association, see Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association
and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1525–33
(2001). Carpenter notes that “[t]he rise of gay equality and public visibility coincided—not
coincidentally, however—with the rise of vigorous protection for First Amendment freedom, especially
the freedom of association.” Id. at 1532–33; see also Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner,
509 F.2d 652, 659–60 (1st Cir. 1974) (“Considering the important role that social events can play in
individuals’ efforts to associate to further their common beliefs, the prohibition of all social events
must be taken to be a substantial abridgement of associational rights, even if assumed to be an indirect
one.”); Brief for Petitionerat 30, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371) [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner] (“In an earlier era, public universities frequently attempted to bar gay rights groups from
recognized student organization status on account of their supposed encouragement of what was then
illegal behavior. The courts made short shrift of those policies.” (citing Gay & Lesbian Student Ass’n
v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 1988))).
3
Matt Zwolinski, Why Not Regulate Private Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1052
(2006) (“The feeling of social isolation that results from private discrimination can be psychologically
devastating. This is especially true for children, who are particularly prone to question their own selfworth in reaction to discrimination from their peers, but the effects hold for adults as well. Private
discrimination can have a tremendous impact on the psychological well-being of even the most selfassured adults.”).
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4

including the value of group autonomy. When these values clash—as
they inevitably do whenever antidiscrimination law challenges a group’s
right to exclude—we ought to encourage a weighing of these constitutional
values rather than a wholesale adoption of one over the other.5 This is no
easy task. Even the polarized ways in which we describe the clash of
values points to the inherent conflict and the stakes at issue: what Andrew
Koppelman and Tobias Wolff characterize as a “right to discriminate”6
might also be called “a right to exist.”7
The Supreme Court has chosen to address these challenges through the
categories of “intimate” and “expressive” association. Koppelman and
Wolff have recently intimated that these categories, first announced in the
1984 decision, Roberts v. United States Jaycees,8 reflect a “well-settled law
of freedom of association.”9 Whether the sixteen years between Roberts
and the Court’s 2000 decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale10
established an “ancien regime”11 is open to question. But the problem with
intimate and expressive association is not simply that they are less
entrenched than Koppelman and Wolff assert—it is that they are
indefensible. Intimate association offers no constitutional protections
beyond those afforded by the right of privacy. Expressive association fails
4
I have chosen to call attention to the value of group autonomy rather than liberty because group
autonomy bears an intrinsic relationship to associational freedom while liberty risks being construed in
individualistic ways.
5
The perennial tension between group autonomy and equality is one reason that John Rawls fails
to provide a persuasive account of freedom of association in attempting to distinguish between the
“basic structure” and the “background society.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 6, 79, 386
(1971). For one critique among many of Rawls along these lines, see NANCY L. ROSENBLUM,
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 53–55 (1998)
[hereinafter ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS]. Rosenblum concludes that “the morality of
association provides a pluralist background culture, much of it incongruent with liberal democracy.”
Id. at 55.
6
ANDREW KOPPELMAN & TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?: HOW THE
CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION xi (2009).
7
Cf. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[F]orcing [the
Christian Legal Society] to accept as members those who engage in or approve of homosexual conduct
would cause the group as it currently identifies itself to cease to exist.”); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS,
THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 142 (1984) (“When an
institution that is voluntary in membership cannot define the conditions of belonging, that institution in
fact ceases to exist.”).
8
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
9
KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at x–xi. I take Koppelman and Wolff’s claim to be that
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), “capriciously and destructively” disrupted the
framework first set in place by Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Id. at x–xi. (“Until 2000,
. . . [a]ssociations that conveyed messages were entitled to be free of restrictions, including restrictions
on their membership practices, that interfered with the dissemination of those messages. Intimate
associations of small groups of people had a stronger right, to refuse association with anyone for any
reason.”). Koppelman and Wolff may have a broader history in mind. For example, they acknowledge
the “germinal case” of the right of association in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958). Id. at 18–22. But it seems clear that Roberts does most of the work that they want to embrace
as the “well-settled law of freedom of association.” Id. at xi.
10
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
11
KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at xi.
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to account for the expressive potential inherent in all groups.
Intimate association and expressive association are indefensible
categories, but they matter deeply. They matter to the Jaycees. They
matter to the Chi Iota Colony of the Alpha Epsilon Pi fraternity, a now
defunct Jewish social group at the College of Staten Island that had sought
to limit its membership to men.12 They matter to the Christian Legal
Society at Hastings Law School, a religious student group denied official
recognition because of its desire to limit its membership to Christians who
adhered to its moral code, which included a prohibition on homosexual
conduct.13 Each of these groups sought to maintain an unpopular
composition and message in the face of antidiscrimination laws. Each was
denied associational protection.
Each was forced to change its
composition—and therefore its message. Each no longer exists in the form
it once held and desired to maintain.
The demise of associational protections is at least partially attributable
to the Roberts categories of intimate and expressive association. These
categories set in place a framework that allows courts to sidestep the hard
work of weighing the constitutional values that shape the law that binds us.
This Article exposes the problems inherent in these categories and calls for
a meaningful constitutional inquiry into laws impinging upon group
autonomy. Absent such an inquiry, we are left with antidiscrimination
norms unchecked by principles of group autonomy. That conclusion was
recently embraced by the Ninth Circuit in denying constitutional
protections to a high school bible club that sought to limit its membership
to Christians:
States have the constitutional authority to enact legislation
prohibiting invidious discrimination. . . . [W]e hold that the
requirement that members [of a high school bible club]
possess a “true desire to . . . grow in a relationship with Jesus
Christ” inherently excludes non-Christians . . . , [thus
violating] the District’s non-discrimination policies. . . .14
The Ninth’s Circuit’s reasoning is troubling, but it in some ways represents
the logical end of the current doctrine of association.
This Article examines the reasoning that has led courts to conclude that
a Christian group that excludes non-Christians is for that reason
invidiously discriminating. Part II revisits the initial recognition of
12

Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 149 (2d
Cir. 2007).
13
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980–81 (2010).
14
Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 644–45 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit relied
exclusively on Truth in rejecting the claims of the Christian Legal Society. See Christian Legal Soc’y
v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
795 (2009), aff’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
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intimate and expressive association in Roberts. Parts III and IV trace the
roots of intimate and expressive association, respectively. Part V details
how the application of these categories in Roberts undermined the
associational claims of the Jaycees. Part VI uses the Chi Iota and Christian
Legal Society cases to illustrate how the Roberts framework continues to
damage associational freedom. Finally, Part VII proposes that the Court
remedy the problems in Roberts by eliminating the categories of intimate
and expressive association. It suggests that we recover a different
constitutional right that offers better historical, theoretical, and doctrinal
resources for strengthening group autonomy and the possibility of dissent:
the right of assembly.15
II. CATEGORIZING THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
The categories of intimate and expressive association first emerged in
Justice Brennan’s 1984 Roberts opinion.16 Brennan announced that the
Court had identified two distinct constitutional sources for the right of
association.17 One line of decisions protected “intimate association” as “a
fundamental element of personal liberty.”18 Another set of decisions
guarded “expressive association,” which was “a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and
the exercise of religion.”19 Brennan contended that intimate and expressive
association represented, respectively, the “intrinsic and instrumental
features of constitutionally protected association.”20 These differences
meant that “the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded
freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to which one or
the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a
given case.”21
Brennan’s arguments implied two corollaries: (1) some associations
were “nonintimate,” and (2) some associations were “nonexpressive.” His
reasoning thus suggested four possible categories of associations: (1)
intimate expressive associations,22 (2) intimate nonexpressive associations,
15
See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 566 (2010)
[hereinafter Inazu, Forgotten Freedom] (describing the historical significance of the right of assembly).
16
The Court first recognized a constitutional right of association in NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). For an overview of the origins of association and its political,
doctrinal, and theoretical underpinnings, see generally John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the
Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485 (2010) [hereinafter Inazu, Strange Origins].
17
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 618.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See id. (“The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally protected association may,
of course, coincide.”).
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(3) nonintimate expressive associations, and (4) nonintimate nonexpressive
associations. Since Roberts, it has become clear that there is no
constitutionally significant distinction between the first two categories;
intimate associations receive the highest level of constitutional protection
regardless of whether they are also expressive.23
The same is not true for the distinctions between the other categories.
Brennan’s parsing of intrinsic and instrumental value and his reference to
the varying “nature and degree of constitutional protection” for intimate
and expressive associations signaled a clear privileging of the former over
the latter.24 And the category of expressive association drew a line that left
nonintimate nonexpressive associations—which would include most of the
groups mentioned at the beginning of this Article—without any
meaningful constitutional protections.25
The Roberts framework thus created the following hierarchically
ordered categories of associations:
A. Intimate Associations
B. Nonintimate Expressive Associations
C. Nonintimate Nonexpressive Associations
It turns out that the groups in B sometimes lose, and the groups in C
always lose.
What is more, once a court places a group within either B or C, a
23

See, e.g., Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2005); Flaskamp v. Dearborn
Pub. Sch., 385 F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 2004); City of Bremerton v. Widell, 51 P.3d 733, 741 (Wash.
2002) (en banc).
24
Brennan’s language did not expressly elevate intimate over expressive association, but it has
been widely interpreted as having made this distinction. See infra note 25 (collecting cases in which
courts have applied less than strict scrutiny to laws impinging upon expressive association); cf.
KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at x (explaining that, under Roberts, “[i]ntimate associations of
small groups of people had a stronger right [than expressive associations], to refuse association with
anyone for any reason”); AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 41 (1995) (contending
that Brennan regarded expressive association “as instrumental and therefore subject to greater
government intrusion”); David E. Bernstein, Expressive Association After Dale, 21 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y. 195, 202 (2004) [hereinafter Bernstein, Expressive Association] (“The Court’s apparent disdain
for expressive association claims had a marked effect on lower courts.”); George Kateb, The Value of
Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 46 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) (“Running through
Brennan’s opinion is the assumption that all nonintimate relationships are simply inferior to intimate
ones.”); Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 532 n.209 (2001) (“In Roberts,
Justice Brennan described a range of associations, each deserving of different levels of Constitutional
protection. While the right to ‘intimate’ association . . . is ‘intrinsic’ and worthy of the highest
Constitutional protection, . . . the right of ‘expressive’ association [is] an instrumental right, and thus
accorded less absolute protection.” (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–20)).
25
See, e.g., City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23–28 (1989) (applying rational basis scrutiny
to a city ordinance governing activity that qualified neither as a form of “intimate association” nor as a
form of “expressive association” as those terms were described in Roberts); Conti v. City of Fremont,
919 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A]n activity receives no special first amendment protection if it
qualifies neither as a form of ‘intimate association’ nor as a form of ‘expressive association,’ as those
terms were described in Roberts.”); Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251–52 (7th Cir. 1990)
(concluding that the First Amendment does not protect nonintimate nonexpressive associations).
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generic appeal to the state’s interest in eradicating discrimination usually
trumps the group’s autonomy.26 In other words, the precise harms that
may or may not be caused by the group do not really matter. Following the
Supreme Court’s lead in Roberts, most judicial opinions weighing
antidiscrimination objectives against group autonomy make little effort to
link the specific remedy—forced inclusion in a particular group—to the
specific harm—the effects of discrimination by that group in its particular
social context.27
Consider the Court’s analysis in Roberts itself. Justice Brennan’s
opinion appealed to “Minnesota’s compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens . . . .”28 He reasoned that
Minnesota furthered that compelling interest by assuring women equal
access to the leadership skills, business contacts, and employment
promotions offered by the Jaycees.29 But the national Jaycees already
allowed women to join as Associate Individual Members, a status that
presumably afforded them many of these business opportunities—the
associate status precluded only voting, holding office, and eligibility for
national awards, but women could “otherwise participate fully in Jaycee
activities.”30 Moreover, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the
Jaycees had, in violation of the national organization’s policies, accepted
women as full members for ten years.31
Roberts’s oft-forgotten procedural posture matters here. The litigation
began when members of the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the
Jaycees brought an administrative enforcement action of the Minnesota
Human Rights Act32 against the national organization after it threatened to
26
Koppelman and Wolff note that while Roberts introduced a “balancing test” when “interference
with membership . . . demonstrably interferes with expressive practice,” as a practical matter, “free
association claims unrelated to viewpoint discrimination always lost in the Supreme Court under this
standard.” KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at 20.
27
Cf. Bernstein, Expressive Association, supra note 24, at 202 (“Following Justice Brennan’s
opinion in Roberts, lower federal courts and state supreme courts routinely held that the right of
expressive association had to yield to antidiscrimination statutes.”); Richard A. Epstein, The
Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 132 (2000)
(“One striking feature of both Roberts and Dale is the ease with which these opinions hold that the
antidiscrimination principle counts as a compelling state interest that limits the ability of voluntary
associations to determine their own membership.”).
28
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
29
Id. at 626.
30
U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1563 (8th Cir. 1983); cf. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621
(“[D]espite their inability to vote, hold office, or receive certain awards, women affiliated with the
Jaycees attend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and engage in many of the
organization’s social functions.”).
31
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614.
32
MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982) (specifying that it is an unfair discriminatory practice “[t]o
deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion,
disability, national origin or sex”). The federal courts deferred to the Minnesota Supreme Court for the
threshold determination of whether the Jaycees fell under the scope of the Act as a “public
accommodation.” See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615–17.
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33

revoke their charters. The national organization responded by suing state
officials in federal district court to prevent enforcement of the Act.34 But
the underlying dispute and the immediate effects of the holding of the case
were always internal to the Jaycees.35
For all of these reasons, it is unclear how forcing the national
organization to recognize women as full members helped to eradicate
gender discrimination in Minnesota by increasing access to the leadership
skills, business contacts, and employment promotions offered by the
Jaycees. Even if the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters had denied full
membership to women, it seems doubtful that making women eligible for
leadership positions or national awards would have advanced Minnesota’s
statutory interests significantly beyond the networking and social
opportunities already afforded by their limited membership status. Justice
Brennan’s Roberts opinion contained no explanation of why this remedy
helped to eradicate gender discrimination in these circumstances sufficient
to trump the autonomy of this group.36 And his analysis did not only
shortchange the Jaycees. The framework of intimate and expressive
association that crystallized in Roberts obscured the need to balance
equality against group autonomy more generally, in part because Brennan
never adequately articulated the theoretical underpinnings of his two
categories of association.
The next two sections will show why the Roberts categories are
fundamentally misguided and how they hinder the important value of
group autonomy. They explore in more detail the roots of these categories
and the theoretical challenges they create. If a coherent theory exists to
justify intimate and expressive association, it has yet to be identified.
III. INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
The category of intimate association likely originated in a 1980 article
by Kenneth Karst in the Yale Law Journal.37 Karst’s article, in turn, drew
from Justice Douglas’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.38 This section
33

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614.
Id. at 615.
35
Moreover, it is plausible—perhaps even likely—that the vision favoring the full inclusion of
women would have won out in the national organization absent interference by the courts. As Judge
Arnold pointed out in the lower court opinion, the question about whether to admit women as full
members had been vigorously debated within the organization, and while resolutions favoring the
admission of women had been defeated on three occasions prior to the Roberts litigation, each time a
larger minority had voted in favor of the resolution. McClure, 709 F.2d at 1561–62, & n.1.
36
William Marshall observes that the Court offered a “one-sided” interpretation of the values
conflict in Roberts: “While the associational rights of the Jaycees were considered to be virtually
nonexistent, the state interests were found to be particularly weighty because of the social and business
prominence of the Jaycees organization.” William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of
Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68, 74 (1986).
37
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626 (1980).
38
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34
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traces these precursors to intimate association and the ways in which
Brennan’s Roberts opinion adopted them.
A. Griswold and the Right of Association
Griswold struck down a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of
contraceptives and the giving of medical advice about their use, and
specifically the application of this law to the use of contraceptives by
married persons.39 Chief Justice Warren assigned the opinion to Douglas.
In a draft that he shared only with Brennan, Douglas relied almost entirely
on the First Amendment right of association,40 which the Court had first
recognized seven years earlier in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.41
Douglas argued that while marriage did “not fit precisely any of the
categories of First Amendment rights,” it was “a form of association as
vital in the life of a man or woman as any other, and perhaps more so.”42
He reasoned that “[w]e would, indeed, have difficulty protecting the
intimacies of one’s relations to [the] NAACP and not the intimacies of
one’s marriage relation.”43
After reviewing the draft, Brennan urged Douglas to abandon his
exclusive reliance on the right of association.44 Brennan argued that
marriage did not fall within the kind of association that the Court had
recognized for purposes of political advocacy.45 He suggested that
Douglas instead analogize the Court’s recognition of the right of
association to a similar broadening of privacy into a constitutional right.
Because neither privacy nor association could be found in the text of the
Constitution, if association could be recognized as a freestanding
constitutional right, then so could privacy.46 In Douglas’s memorable
formulation: “[The] specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give

39

Id. at 480, 485.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 237 (1985).
Douglas’s only mention of privacy in the draft came in the concluding paragraph: “The prospects of
police with warrants searching the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives is repulsive to the idea of privacy and association that make up a goodly part of the
penumbra of the Constitution and Bill of Rights.” Id. at 236 (quoting Douglas’s draft opinion).
Schwartz writes that Douglas’s sole mention of privacy in the last sentence of his draft “is scarcely
enough to make it the foundation for any constitutional right of privacy, particularly for the broadside
right established by the final Griswold opinion.” Id. at 230.
41
357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). For a discussion of the Court’s initial recognition of a right of
association in this case, see Inazu, Strange Origins, supra note 16, at 485.
42
SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 235 (quoting Douglas’s draft opinion).
43
Id. at 235.
44
Id. at 237. Brennan argued that Douglas’s expanded view of association would extend First
Amendment protection to the Communist Party. Id. at 237–38.
45
Id. at 237.
46
Id. at 238.
40
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them life and substance.”
The connection between association and privacy had been established
in the some of the earliest right of association cases.48 In fact, Justice
Harlan’s seminal opinion in NAACP v. Alabama had referred to “the vital
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s
associations.”49 But associational privacy drew from different values than
the sense of individual autonomy conveyed by the right “to be let alone.”50
Privacy in the early right of association cases had more to do with
protecting the boundaries of group autonomy. As Harlan had argued in
NAACP v. Alabama, “[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may in
many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”51 That
kind of privacy did not mean “not public”—in fact, groups like the
NAACP and the Communist Party had actively sought public visibility and
recognition. It was in this group context that Douglas had first argued for
“the need for a pervasive right of privacy against government intrusion”
and a “right of privacy implicit in the First Amendment [that] creates an
area into which the Government may not enter.”52
In Griswold, Douglas linked his earlier understanding of associational
privacy to marriage by emphasizing the human relationships common to all
associations:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.53
This relational focus may have drawn an unlikely connection between
a married couple and the NAACP, but it resisted the kind individualism

47

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 560 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (noting restrictions set forth by the Fourteenth Amendment that limit states’ efforts “to
investigate people, their ideas, their activities”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266–67
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (acknowledging “the right of a citizen to political privacy, as
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
49
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
50
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
52
Gibson, 372 U.S. at 569–70 (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas reiterated these arguments in a
lecture that he delivered at Brown University which was published subsequently in the Columbia Law
Review. William O. Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1361, 1363, 1367 (1963).
53
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
48
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that equated associational privacy with “the privacy of private life.”
Seven years later, Brennan upended that relational focus in Eisenstadt
v. Baird, which extended Griswold’s holding to unmarried persons desiring
access to contraception.55 His majority opinion relied heavily on Griswold,
but not on Douglas’s reasoning:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.56
Brennan’s language thus converted an understanding of associational
freedom rooted in relationships between people to a right of individual
autonomy. As H. Jefferson Powell has argued, “Brennan’s reading of
Griswold turned Douglas’s reasoning on its head,” and Eisenstadt signaled
“the identification of a radically individualistic liberalism as the moral
content of American constitutionalism.”57
B. Karst’s Intimate Association
Karst’s 1980 article sought to recover the relational emphasis in
Griswold that Brennan had abandoned in Eisenstadt.58 He began by noting
that Douglas had focused specifically on the association of marriage. Karst
contended that this language had established a freedom of “‘intimate
association,’” which he suggested was “a close and familiar personal
relationship with another that is in some significant way comparable to a
marriage or family relationship.”59
54

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 215.
405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
57
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A
THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 176, 177 (1993).
58
Although Karst’s interpretation of Griswold was more nuanced than Brennan’s opinions in
either Eisenstadt or Roberts, Karst’s own liberal individualism prevented him from fully developing
Douglas’s non-individualistic arguments about association. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 37, at 626
(footnotes omitted) (“[T]he constitutional freedom of intimate association thus serves as an organizing
principle in a number of associational contexts by promoting awareness of the importance of [certain]
values to the development of a sense of individuality”); cf. Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville,
Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 549 (1993)
(placing Karst in a class of scholars who “still structure their accounts” on the premise that “[i]lliberal,
undemocratic beliefs and practices [are] seen only as expressions of ignorance and prejudice, destined
to marginality by their lack of rational defenses”).
59
Karst, supra note 37, at 629.
55
56
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The problem with Karst’s argument is its implicit corollary that some
groups are “nonintimate associations,” and that a constitutionally
significant line can be drawn between intimate and nonintimate
associations. The fundamental critique of both Karst’s argument in this
subsection and Brennan’s argument in the following subsection is that they
fail on their own terms to provide a defensible rationale for their linedrawing. They fail for the simple reason that all of the values, benefits,
and attributes that they assign to intimate associations are equally
applicable to many, if not most, nonintimate associations.60
Karst at times recognized the broader applicability of his claims. He
noted that “[a]n intimate association, like any group, is more than the sum
of its members; it is a new being, a collective individuality with a life of its
own.”61 And he wrote that “[o]ne of the points of any freedom of
association must be to let people make their own definitions of
community.”62 Yet despite these occasional concessions, Karst repeatedly
placed special value on the relationships that form intimate associations.
For example, Karst repeatedly emphasized the importance of “close
friendship” in intimate association.63 For Karst, it was “plain that the
values of intimate association may be realized in friendships involving
neither sexual intimacy nor family ties,” and that “[a]ny view of intimate
association focused on associational values must therefore include
friendship . . . .”64 He also tied intimate association to the kinds of bonds
that form through personal interaction: the “chief value in intimate
association is the opportunity to satisfy” the “need to love and be loved”;65
“[t]he opportunity to be cared for by another in an intimate association is
60
The one distinction that may have been plausible when Karst wrote in 1980 is no longer true
today. Karst claimed that intimate association “implies an expectation of access of one person to
another particular person’s physical presence, some opportunity for face-to-face encounter.” Id. at 630.
While physical presence may have been a distinguishing characteristic of intimate associations thirty
years ago, that is no longer true today. Many people now bridge physical separation and connect in
emotionally rich ways with friends and family through online social networking sites, blogs, and video
conferencing. Others project their identities or create new ones through virtual representations ranging
from simple text (like an online profile) to avatars. Some of these online relationships foster deep
feelings of intimacy and connectedness. See, e.g., HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY:
HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (revised ed., 2000); Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1171–72 (2000) (noting that in online forums, “pregnant women share
experiences; the elderly console each other after losing loved ones; patients fighting cancer provide
information and support; disabled children find friends who do not judge them immediately on their
disability; users share stories about drug addiction; and gays and lesbians on the brink of coming out
give each other emotional shelter”).
61
Karst, supra note 37, at 629 (emphasis added).
62
Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
63
Id. at 629 (“The connecting links that distinguish [an intimate] association from, say,
membership in the PTA may take the form of living in the same quarters, or sexual intimacy, or blood
ties, or a formal relationship, or some mixtures of these, but in principle the idea of intimate association
also includes close friendship, with or without any such links.”).
64
Id. at 629 n.26.
65
Id. at 632.
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normally complemented by the opportunity for caring” that requires a
“personal commitment”;66 “[c]aring for an intimate requires taking the
trouble to know him and deal with him as a whole person, not just as the
occupant of a role,” which “limits the number of intimate associations any
one person can have at any one time, or even in a lifetime.”67
Karst’s attention to friendship and personal bonds is eminently
reasonable. But the potential for and the existence of such close
friendships can be found in many kinds of associations, including many
that would not meet the current legal definition of intimate associations. It
may well be that attributes of friendship and personal bonds distinguish
small or local groups from large and impersonal groups such as behemoth
mailing list organizations. But surely fraternities, student groups, and local
chapters of civic associations are capable of producing “close friendships”
of the kind that Karst describes.
To be sure, some relationships between members of these groups will
be superficial and casual. But this is also true of the relationships that
constitute many intimate associations. Karst recognized that protecting the
values he saw as inherent in intimate association required offering “some
protection to casual associations as well as lasting ones.”68 In fact, “[o]ne
reason for extending constitutional protection to casual intimate
associations is that they may ripen into durable intimate associations.”69
Karst argued that “[a] doctrinal system extending the freedom of intimate
association only to cases of enduring commitment would require
intolerable inquiries into subjects that should be kept private, including
states of mind.”70 It is hard to understand why these principles would not
apply equally to nonintimate associations.
Karst’s other attempts to mark the bounds of intimate association are
similarly unavailing:
An intimate association may influence a person’s selfdefinition not only by what it says to him but also by what it
says (or what he thinks it says) to others.71
....
Transient or enduring, chosen or not, our intimate
associations profoundly affect our personalities and our
senses of self. When they are chosen, they take on

66

Id.
Id. at 634–35.
68
Id. at 633.
69
Id.; cf. id. at 688 (“[A]ny constitutional protection of enduring sexual relationships can be
effective only if it is extended to the choice to engage in casual ones . . . .”).
70
Id. at 633.
71
Id. at 636.
67
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expressive dimensions as statements defining ourselves.
....

When two people [voluntarily enter into an intimate
association], they express themselves more eloquently, tell us
more about who they are and who they hope to be, than they
ever could do by wearing armbands or carrying red flags.73
....
First Amendment doctrine cautions us to be sensitive to the
need to protect intimate associations that are unconventional
or that may offend a majority of the community.74
Each of these claims applies with equal force if we remove the
adjective “intimate.” Some associations and associative acts will lack
significance for some people, but that is true for both intimate and
nonintimate associations. The extent to which expression, self-definition,
and unconventional norms unfold in a group’s practices is not contingent
upon whether the group is an intimate association.
Some of Karst’s conceptual problems likely arose because he was not
explicitly attempting to distinguish intimate from nonintimate associations.
He appears to focus on trying to develop a category of intimate association
as an alternative to the then-nascent right of privacy,75 and to use the right
of intimate association to advance legal protections for homosexual
relationships.76 Today, these particular goals are unlikely to be advanced
by the right of intimate association.77 We need look no further than
72

Id. at 637.
Id. at 654.
74
Id. at 658.
75
Karst regarded the freedom of intimate association as on “the cutting edge” of “the current
revival of substantive due process.” Id. at 665. In contrast, he believed that “[c]alling the rights in
Griswold and Roe rights of privacy invites the rejection of comparable claims on the ground that, after
all, they do not rest on any concerns about control over the disclosure of information.” Id. at 664.
76
See, e.g., id. at 672 (“[A]s I have argued in connection with the prohibition on homosexual
conduct, there is no legitimacy in an effort by the state to advance one view of morals by preventing the
expression of another view.”); id. at 682 (“By now it will be obvious that the freedom of intimate
association extends to homosexual associations as it does to heterosexual ones.”); id. at 685 (“The chief
importance of the freedom of intimate association as an organizing principle in the area of homosexual
relationships is that it lets us see how closely homosexual associations resemble marriage and other
heterosexual associations.”).
77
Toni Massaro has recognized the “problems” with relying on intimate association to advance
gay rights: “While a robust freedom of association principle promises greater freedom to gay men and
lesbians to choose their companions, it also promises greater freedom to others to choose not to
associate with gay men and lesbians.” Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 45, 66 (1996). Massaro identifies a risk in gay rights scholars advocating for neutral applications
of the right of association: “Unless we aim for an asymmetrical version of freedom of association, or
one that is zoned in a manner similar to that of freedom of expression, this call to neutrality, taken
alone, may be the riskiest approach of all.” Id. But see Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of
Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 311–12 (2006)
(arguing for a greater role for intimate association in gay rights).
73
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78

Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court’s overruling of its decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick.79 Bowers drew two dissents, one from Justice
Stevens that emphasized Griswold’s liberty arguments,80 and one from
Justice Blackmun that drew upon Griswold’s intimate association
arguments and twice cited Karst’s article.81 Lawrence relied on Stevens’s
dissent and never mentioned the right of intimate association.82
C. Brennan’s Intimate Association
Brennan’s Roberts opinion never cites Karst’s article, but the
intellectual debt is apparent.83 And while Karst had focused on increasing
protections for intimate associations, Brennan’s use of the category of
intimate association degraded protections for nonintimate ones.84 He
78

539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
80
Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81
Id. at 204–05, 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Karst, supra note 37, at 627, 637).
82
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been
controlling in Bowers and should control here.”). Nancy Marcus has suggested that “principles of
intimate association underlie the Lawrence decision” and that “Lawrence is the first actual affirmation
of a litigant’s intimate associational rights by the Supreme Court since Roberts.” Marcus, supra note
77, at 303, 308. Laura Rosenbury and Jennifer Rothman argue similarly that the majority’s “shift from
sex acts to relationships aligns Lawrence with the right to intimate association already articulated by
the Court in other contexts.” Laura A. Rosenbury and Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of
Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 826 (2010). These claims seem undermined by the lack of any mention
of intimate association in the Lawrence opinion, particularly in light of the fact that the Justices had
before them Blackmun’s Bowers dissent and arguments about intimate association from the Lawrence
Petitioners. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003
WL 152352 at *11–12, *15 & n.9 (citing Karst’s article, discussing Roberts’s category of intimate
association, and asserting that “[t]he adult couple whose shared life includes sexual intimacy is
undoubtedly one of the most important and profound forms of intimate association”); Reply Brief of
Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 1098835 at *5 (“The
relationship of an adult couple—whether heterosexual or gay—united by sexual intimacy is the very
paradigm of an intimate association in which one finds ‘emotional enrichment’ and ‘independently . . .
define[s] one’s identity,’ and it is protected as such from ‘unwarranted state interference.’” (quoting
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–20 (1984))).
83
The similarities between Karst’s article and Brennan’s opinion have gone relatively unnoticed.
Among the few articles making the connection are Marcus, supra note 77, at 278, and Collin O’Connor
Udell, Intimate Association: Resurrecting a Hybrid Right, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 231 (1998). Udell
suggests that Roberts “lifted the right to intimate association from Karst’s article.” Id. at 232.
84
Post-Roberts cases have made clear that most associations are nonintimate, and few courts have
extended the category of intimate association beyond family relationships. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dall., 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (holding that patrons of a motel which limited room rentals to
ten hours did not have an intimate relationship protected by the Constitution), overruled on other
grounds by City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004); City of Dall. v. Stanglin,
490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989) (holding that dance hall patrons “are not engaged in the sort of ‘intimate human
relationships’ referred to in Roberts” that give rise to the protections of intimate association); Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987) (holding that the relationship
among Rotary Club members is not the type of intimate relationship that merits constitutional
protection); Poirier v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 558 F.3d 92, 96 (1st Cir. 2009) (refusing to extend
protections of intimate association to “[t]he unmarried cohabitation of adults”); Borden v. Sch. Dist. of
Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 173 (3d Cir. 2008) (“While the Supreme Court has held that the
Constitution protects certain relationships, those protected relationships require a closeness that is not
present between a high school football coach and his team.”); Swanson v. City of Bruce, 105 F. App’x
79
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began by noting: “[C]ertain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical
role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act
as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State.”85
This passage attempts to draw the reader into a kind of Tocquevillean ethos
in which intimate associations at once facilitate support for “the Nation”
and resistance to “the State.”86 But Brennan’s argument lacks coherence
and specificity. What is the difference between Nation and State? What
are the national culture (singular) and national traditions (plural) brought
about by “shared ideals and beliefs”? How do personal bonds “foster
diversity” and act as “critical buffers” from state power? More to the
point, why are these functions unique to intimate associations? If
Brennan’s argument is that intimate associations sustain some kind of
shared culture—“cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs”—
then why can’t nonintimate associations also serve as “schools of
democracy”?87 Conversely, if he means to position intimate associations
as “mediating structures”88 between individuals and the state—“foster[ing]
diversity and act[ing] as critical buffers”—then don’t some of the largest—
and least intimate—groups have the greatest capacity to resist the state?
The passage also belies a more troubling vagueness. It contains an
irresolvable tension that doesn’t let the reader know whether Brennan is
ultimately prioritizing the state, the non-state group, or the individual, and
540, 542 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The tight fellowship among police officers, precious though it may be, does
not include ‘such deep attachments and commitments of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs’ or personal
aspects of officers’ lives sufficient to constitute an intimate relationship.” (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at
620)); Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding
that a college fraternity is not an intimate association); Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 919
F.2d 183, 198 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that intimate association is unlikely to cover religious groups
because “[m]ost religious groups do not exhibit the distinctive attributes the Court has identified as
helpful in determining whether the freedom of association is implicated”); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845
F.2d 1195, 1205 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a brother-in-law relationship is not protected as an
intimate association). But see Anderson v. City of LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2004)
(assuming, for summary judgment purposes, that a dating relationship between two police officers
qualified as an intimate association because the two were monogamous, had lived together, and were
romantically and sexually involved); Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1039–40 (6th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that some types of personal friendships may constitute intimate associations); La. Debating
and Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1497–98 (5th Cir. 1995) (extending the right
of “private association” to a private club).
85
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19 (1984).
86
The textual tension in some ways replicates the strain between stability and pluralism of midtwentieth century liberalism and the ways in which scholars like Robert Dahl and David Truman
appropriate Tocqueville. See generally Inazu, Strange Origins, supra note 16.
87
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 511 (Henry Reeve trans. 1899). Indeed,
as Nancy Rosenblum has argued: “The onus for cultivating the moral dispositions of liberal democratic
citizens falls heavily on voluntary groups such as the Jaycees and their myriad counterparts.” Nancy
Rosenblum, Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion, in
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 75, 76 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Compelled
Association].
88
PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL
SOCIETY 51–63 (2d ed. 1996).
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the answer to that question matters a great deal. From the rest of his
opinion and his broader jurisprudence, we might infer that Brennan wants
to privilege the individual, then the state, and lastly, the group. But if that
is where his argument rests, then some language—“critical buffers,”
“traditions,” “shared ideals”—becomes much harder for him to employ in
an unqualified sense.
Brennan next enlisted notions of liberty and autonomy in his defense
of intimate association, embracing the individualistic gloss that his
Eisenstadt opinion had cast on Griswold: “[T]he constitutional shelter
afforded [intimate associations] reflects the realization that individuals
draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore
safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central
to any concept of liberty.”89 These phrases—“emotional enrichment,”
“[defining] one’s identity,” and “[the] concept of liberty”—again call to
mind lofty ideals, but their meanings are imprecise.90 As before, Brennan
fails to explain why his reasoning extends only to intimate associations.
People form close ties with others through all kinds of associations. Some
lifelong friendships emerge from within nonintimate associations; some
intimate associations collapse in a matter of months.91 Self-definition also
comes in myriad forms of association—one’s decision to join the ACLU or
make a financial contribution to Greenpeace can speak volumes about his
or her identity.
Like Karst, Brennan fails to offer a convincing rationale for privileging
intimate associations over nonintimate ones. His theoretical anchor is the
residue of Eisenstadt that supplants the inherently relational aspects of
association with an individualistic notion of privacy. Intimate association
is reduced to intimate individualism.92

89

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.”).
91
Or hours. See, e.g., Britney Spears Sheds Another Husband, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at E2
(referencing Spears’s annulment of marriage to her childhood friend, Jason Alexander, fifty-five hours
after they wed).
92
The constitutional protections offered by intimate association are today almost completely
redundant of those found in the right of privacy. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933,
937 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The freedom of intimate association ‘receives protection as a fundamental
element of personal liberty,’ and as such is protected by the due process clauses.” (quoting Roberts, 468
U.S. at 618)); Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 385 F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Whether called a
right to intimate association, or a right to privacy, the point is similar: ‘choices to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State
because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our
constitutional scheme.’” (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18)); City of Bremerton v. Widell, 51 P.3d
733, 741 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (“[O]ur own cases have held that the right of intimate association
stems from the right of privacy, which normally applies only to familial relationships, and ‘extend[s]
90
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IV. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
The second category that Brennan announced in Roberts was
expressive association. Like intimate association, it has distant echoes of
Douglas’s Griswold opinion and the Court’s earliest cases on the right of
association.93 But it is shaped even more determinatively by decisions that
emerged out of the Civil Rights Era. This section assesses the doctrinal
developments in these cases and then examines the ways in which Brennan
adopted them in Roberts.
A. Civil Rights and the Right to Exclude
Douglas had argued in Griswold that the right of association “includes
the right to express one’s attitudes or philosophies by membership in a
group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means.”94 In other words,
as he had asserted in a dissent four years earlier, “[j]oining is one method
of expression.”95 Seven years after Griswold, Douglas insisted that the
right of association included the right not to associate:
The associational rights which our system honors permit all
white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed.
They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs
to be established. Government may not tell a man or woman
who his or her associates must be. The individual can be as
selective as he desires.96
For Douglas, the First Amendment “precludes government from interfering
with private clubs or groups.”97
Douglas’s defense of the “right to exclude” came in the midst of the
Civil Rights Era when racist white groups repeatedly invoked the right of
association in an attempt to curb integration. In Herbert Wechsler’s
infamous formulation, “integration force[d] an association upon those for

only as far as the principles of substantive due process permit.’” (quoting Bedford v. Sugarman, 772
P.2d 486, 495 (Wash. 1989))).
93
Karst may have also played a role in shaping the category of expressive association by
recasting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson as a case of “political association.” Karst, supra note
37, at 656–57 n.149 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)). Harlan’s
opinion in the earlier case had contained no such adjective. In recent decades, the Court appears to
have developed a distinct right of “political association” in a line of cases involving closed and semiclosed primaries. E.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005); Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986).
94
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
95
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 882 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
96
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179–80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
97
Id. at 179; see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(“Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every person to
close his home or club to any person . . . solely on the basis of personal prejudices including race.”).
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98

whom it [was] unpleasant or repugnant.” Wechsler’s objection made no
sense in public settings.99 But Charles Black’s response to Wechsler was
equally unavailing. Black argued that the freedom not to associate “exists
only at home; in public, we have to associate with anybody who has a right
to be there.”100 In our society, the boundary between public and private is
not, and never has been, the home. People live their private lives outside
of the home in religious communities, civic groups, social clubs, and a
panoply of other collective enterprises that do not border on “public” in the
sense that Black employed the term.
The critical question for the right of association during the Civil Rights
Era was the extent to which it could justify private discrimination by
whites against African Americans, and the issue was far more complicated
than either Wechsler or Black suggested. Three important legal
developments provided an answer to this question: (1) the Civil Rights Act
of 1964; (2) the Court’s 1968 decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.;101
and (3) the Court’s 1976 decision in Runyon v. McCrary.102
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited racial discrimination
in places of “public accommodation.”103 The legislation encompassed
inns, restaurants, gas stations, and places of entertainment but exempted
private clubs and other establishments “not in fact open to the public.”104
Five years later, the Court made clear that sham attempts to meet the
private club exception would not prevail.105
The second important development for the right of association during
the Civil Rights Era was the Court’s 1968 decision in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer, which interpreted a Reconstruction era statute, the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, to bar racial discrimination in the sale or lease of private

98

(1959).

Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34

99
Although Wechsler directed part of his critique against Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), it was implausible to argue that segregationists had a freedom to associate (or a right to
exclude) in situations where the government provided a public good or service. Cf. ANDREW
KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 179 (1996) (“Wechsler’s objection to
Brown is silly with respect to public schools . . . .”).
100
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 429
(1960). The exchange between Wechsler and Black is recounted in KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note
6, at 17.
101
392 U.S. 409, 444 (1968).
102
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
103
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000h-6
(2006)); cf. Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L.
REV. 781, 816 (2007) (“The statute’s extension of the civil rights norm to private conduct marks a
striking shift from constitutional requirements that pertain only to a state actor.”).
104
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b), (e).
105
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301–02 (1969) (rejecting an amusement park’s contention that it
was a private club exempt from the Act because it charged patrons a twenty-five cent “membership”
fee and distributed “membership” cards).
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property.
The Court reasoned that the 1866 Act reached even private
discrimination because “the exclusion of Negroes from white
communities” reflected “the badges and incidents of slavery.”107 It
extended the reach of Jones to membership in a community park and
playground in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,108 and a private
swimming pool in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n.109 Jones,
Sullivan, and Tillman all involved sales or leases related to real property
covered under the Fair Housing Act of 1968.110 The Court’s reliance on a
somewhat strained interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 rather
than a straightforward application of the Fair Housing Act prompted
Justice Harlan (joined by Justice White and Chief Justice Burger) to
dissent in Sullivan, noting that the “vague and open-ended” construction of
section 1982 risked “grave constitutional issues should [that authority] be
extended too far into some types of private discrimination.”111
These two developments—the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Court’s decision in Jones—represented major steps toward ending
segregation. Both also constrained group autonomy. But few people today
object to these constraints along racial or any other lines—the idea that
owners of businesses open to the public or sellers of private homes should
have a constitutional right to discriminate finds few defenders. In other
words, if the constraints on group autonomy were limited to these
applications, contemporary debates would be virtually nonexistent.
More complicated questions arose from the Court’s line of cases
addressing private school segregation that culminated in its 1976 decision
in Runyon v. McCrary.112 These private segregated schools, many of
which emerged in the wake of the Court’s integration of public schools,
represented a key battleground of the Civil Rights Era.113 Preliminary
challenges focused on government financial support, and in the late 1960s,
the Court affirmed a number of decisions enjoining state tuition grants to
106
Jones, 392 U.S. at 444. As George Rutherglen notes, the Court’s interpretive analysis “has
proven to be controversial,” but “the extension of the 1866 Act to private discrimination in Jones was
both much more acceptable and much less radical” because “the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had
legitimatized federal regulation of private discrimination.” George Rutherglen, Civil Rights in Private
Schools: The Surprising Story of Runyon v. McCrary, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 119 (Myriam E. Gilles
& Risa Lauren Goluboff eds., 2008).
107
Jones, 392 U.S. at 441–42.
108
396 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1969).
109
410 U.S. 431, 432, 437 (1973).
110
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631. In Sullivan, the Court characterized Little Hunting Park’s exclusion
of African Americans as “a device functionally comparable to a racially restrictive covenant.” 396
U.S. at 236. In Tillman, a unanimous Court concluded that “[t]he structure and practices of WheatonHaven . . . are indistinguishable from those of Little Haven Park.” 410 U.S. at 438.
111
Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 241, 248 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
112
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
113
On the emergence of segregated private schools in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see, for
example, DAVID NEVIN AND ROBERT E. BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT: SEGREGATIONIST
ACADEMIES IN THE SOUTH (1976).
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students attending racially discriminatory private schools.
In 1973, the
Court concluded in Norwood v. Harrison that state-funded textbook loans
to students attending these schools were “not legally distinguishable” from
tuition grants.115 Norwood was the Court’s first explicit consideration of
the conflict between anti-discrimination norms and the right of association.
Summarizing recent legislative and judicial developments, Chief Justice
Burger noted that “although the Constitution does not proscribe private
bias, it places no value on discrimination.”116
Shortly after Norwood, the Justices addressed the use of public
recreational facilities by private segregated schools in Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery.117 Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion noted that in contrast
to the relatively easy question of integrating public facilities and programs,
“[t]he problem of private group use is much more complex.”118 The
dispositive question was whether the use of public facilities made the
government “a joint participant in the challenged activity.”119 The Court
concluded that municipal recreational facilities, including parks,
playgrounds, athletic facilities, amphitheaters, museums, and zoos, were
sufficiently akin to “generalized governmental services” like traditional
state monopolies, such as electricity, water, and police and fire
protection.120 Accordingly, the use of these facilities by private groups that
discriminated on the basis of race did not rise to the level of government
endorsement of discriminatory practices.121 But Blackmun went even
further, noting that the exclusion of a discriminatory group from public
facilities would violate the group’s freedom of association.122 He asserted
that “[t]he freedom to associate applies to the beliefs we share, and to those
we consider reprehensible” and “tends to produce the diversity of opinion
that oils the machinery of democratic government and insures peaceful,

114
E.g., Brown v. S.C. Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199, 202–03 (D.S.C. 1968), aff’d per curiam,
393 U.S. 222 (1968); Poindexter v. La. Fin. Assistance Comm’n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 835 (E.D. La.
1967), aff’d per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
115
413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973).
116
Id. at 463. Burger concluded that simply because “the Constitution may compel toleration of
private discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for such
discrimination.” Id. Additionally, “even some private discrimination is subject to special remedial
legislation in certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment . . . .” Id. at 470.
117
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 567 (1974). The decision came after repeated
instances of Montgomery’s blatant disregard of mandates to integrate its public facilities. Id. at 569–
72.
118
Id. at 572.
119
Id. at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120
Id. at 574.
121
Blackmun observed that the result might be different if “the city or other governmental entity
rations otherwise freely accessible recreational facilities” in a manner suggestive of discriminatory
intent. Id.
122
Id. at 575. (quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179–80 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
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orderly change.”
At the same time, he cautioned that “the very exercise
of the freedom to associate by some may serve to infringe that freedom for
others. Invidious discrimination takes its own toll on the freedom to
associate, and it is not subject to affirmative constitutional protection when
it involves state action.”124
Two years later, the Court retreated from both its defense of the right
of association and its state action requirement in Runyon, a decision that
construed another provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to preclude
racial discrimination by “private, commercially operated, nonsectarian
schools.”125 Rejecting the suggestion that the legislation “d[id] not reach
private acts of racial discrimination,”126 Justice Stewart wrote:
From [the] principle [of the freedom of association] it
may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to
send their children to educational institutions that promote
the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and that the
children have an equal right to attend such institutions. But it
does not follow that the practice of excluding racial
minorities from such institutions is also protected by the
same principle.127
Stewart buttressed his argument with a truncated quotation from
Norwood. Burger had written in Norwood that, “although the Constitution
does not proscribe private bias, it places no value on discrimination.”128
Stewart’s quotation omitted Burger’s prefatory clause and asserted: “As
the Court stated in Norwood[,] . . . the Constitution . . . places no value on
discrimination.”129 The abbreviated language stood for a broader legal
principle.
Norwood had prevented government subsidization of a
disfavored social practice. Runyon precluded the practice itself and
marked the first time that Court had in the interest of antidiscrimination
norms denied the right of existence to a private group with neither ties to
state action nor meeting the definition of a public accommodation.130
Runyon’s symbolic and substantive importance is beyond challenge.
The decision made clear that the Court understood the Civil Rights Act of
1866 “to reach all intentional racial discrimination, public and private, that
interfered with the right to contract,” and that it trumped the right of
123

Gilmore, 417 U.S. at 575.
Id.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976).
126
Id. at 173.
127
Id. at 176 (emphasis omitted).
128
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) (emphasis added).
129
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130
See Rutherglen, supra note 106, at 111 (Runyon “subordinated private choice to civil rights
policy and extended federal law beyond the limitations of the state action doctrine”).
124
125
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association.
That core holding has been undisturbed and was, in fact,
codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.132 Few people today believe that
private schools ought to have a constitutional right to exclude AfricanAmericans, and the decision as a symbolic marker for civil rights and
racial integration is indisputable.
Runyon’s doctrinal significance is less clear, and it is on this doctrinal
level that the case maintains its greatest significance for contested
questions of group autonomy today. Two moves in particular are open to
question, and both of them are mirrored eight years later in Roberts’s much
different context. The first is the argument that forced inclusion of
unwanted members does not change the core expression of a
discriminatory group. Justice Stewart quoted with approval the Fourth
Circuit’s conclusion that “‘there is no showing that discontinuance of [the]
discriminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way the teaching
in these schools of any ideas or dogma.”’133 If we set aside the political
and moral context of Runyon and examine the argument on its own terms,
it is implausible to claim that forcing a school to abandon its racially
discriminatory admissions policy would not inhibit its teaching of racist
ideas and dogma.134 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit made a related observation about the message conveyed by a
group’s very existence in upholding the associational rights of a gay
student group:
[B]eyond the specific communications at [its] events is the
131

John Hope Franklin, The Civil Rights Act of 1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1138

(1990).

132

See Rutherglen, supra note 106, at 111, 122 (noting that in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 171–75 (1989), the Court decided against overruling Runyon and that Patterson was
superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, “which amended section 1981 to make clear that it covered
all aspects of contractual relations and applied to all contracts”).
133
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975)).
134
See KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at 19 (“If the schools are integrated, it is hard to
imagine that this will not have some effect on the ideas taught.”); William Buss, Discrimination by
Private Clubs, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 815, 831 (1989) (“[T]he assertion that forcing a school to admit black
children will ‘in no way’ inhibit the school’s intended message that racial integration is bad proves too
much to swallow. Just as government-mandated school segregation conveys a powerful message that
black people are unworthy to associate with whites, state-mandated integration conveys a powerful
message that blacks and whites are human beings with equal worth and dignity. That message must
blunt any merely verbal message, taught in the school, that segregation is a good thing.” (footnote
omitted)). Some scholars have nevertheless left Stewart’s reasoning here unchallenged, arguing instead
that the defendants in Runyon never contended that they should be protected as “expressive
associations,” notwithstanding the fact that the Court had yet to recognize such a category. See, e.g.,
David E. Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and Private Universities’ Racial Preferences
and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619, 626–27 (2001) (“[A] close reading of Runyon and
the briefs filed in it reveal that Runyon was not an ‘expressive association’ case. The defendants in
Runyon made what amounts to a short, throw-away argument that their right to ‘freedom of
association,’ floating somewhere in the penumbral ether of the Constitution, was violated by compelled
integration. However, the defendants did not make an expressive association claim grounded in the
First Amendment. They did not argue in their briefs that the school’s ability to promote segregation
would be compromised, nor did they provide evidence at trial on that issue.”).
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basic “message” [Gay Students Organization] seeks to
convey—that homosexuals exist, that they feel repressed by
existing laws and attitudes, that they wish to emerge from
their isolation, and that public understanding of their attitudes
and problems is desirable for society.135
Stewart’s second questionable doctrinal move was his distinction
between the act of discrimination and the message of discrimination. In
Stewart’s view, the right of association protected only the latter, and the
exclusion of African Americans counted only as the former. In other
words, the right of association only extended to the expression of ideas,
and exclusion wasn’t expression. But that argument makes an arbitrary
distinction between act and message that could be applied to any form of
symbolic expression. It tells us nothing about the value or harm of the
expression itself.136
B. Brennan’s Expressive Association
Brennan’s Roberts opinion characterized expressive association as “for
the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and
the exercise of religion.”137 The Court had “long understood as implicit in
the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”138
135

Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 661 (1st Cir. 1974).
Stewart soon reiterated this narrower understanding of the right of association in cases beyond
the Civil Rights context. Writing for the majority in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, a 1977 case
involving an “agency shop” arrangement for state government employees, he described “the freedom of
an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas.” 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977)
(emphasis added). And four years later, writing for the Court in Democratic Party of the United States
v. Wisconsin, a case involving political parties, Stewart referred to the “freedom to gather in association
for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs.” 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981) (emphasis added). That same
year, Burger echoed Stewart’s view in Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley. 454 U.S. 290 (1981)
(emphasis added). Although acknowledging that “the practice of persons sharing common views
banding together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process,”
Burger asserted that the real value of association was “that by collective effort individuals can make
their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost.” Id. at 294 (emphasis
added). Three years later, Brennan adopted Stewart’s distinction between belief and practice and
rendered association wholly instrumental to other First Amendment freedoms. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
137
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
138
Id. at 622. Lower courts have generally adopted Brennan’s instrumental gloss on expressive
association. See, e.g., Schultz v. Wilson, 304 F. App’x 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A social group is not
protected unless it engages in expressive activity such as taking a stance on an issue of public, political,
social, or cultural importance.”); Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 261 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[A]
constitutionally protected right to associate depends upon the existence of an activity that is itself
protected by the First Amendment.”); Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 50
(1st Cir. 2005) (“[I]n a free speech case, an association’s expressive purpose may pertain to a wide
array of ends (including economic ends), but the embedded associational right protects only collective
136
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Despite his instrumental characterization of expressive association,
Brennan proposed an ostensibly protective legal test: “Infringements on
[the right of expressive association] may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive
of associational freedoms.”139
The language of “compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas” calls to mind the strict scrutiny standard established
in other areas of the Court’s First Amendment law.140 But the reference to
“means significantly less restrictive” differs from the usual strict scrutiny
language of “least restrictive means.”141 On closer examination, what
resembles a strict scrutiny test might actually invert the presumption
favoring the protected First Amendment activity to one that favors the
government. Brennan’s phrasing suggests that a government regulation
that is to a large extent—but not significantly more—restrictive of
associational freedoms than a less onerous regulation would survive the
test. Although Brennan elsewhere intimated that he was applying strict
speech and expressive conduct in pursuit of those ends; it does not cover concerted action that lacks an
expressive purpose.” (internal citations omitted)); McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.
1994) (“The right of expressive association . . . is protected by the First Amendment as a necessary
corollary of the rights that the amendment protects by its terms. . . . [A] plaintiff . . . can obtain special
protection for an asserted associational right if she can demonstrate . . . that the purpose of the
association is to engage in activities independently protected by the First Amendment.” (internal
citations omitted)); Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 199 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The
[Supreme] Court has not yet defined the parameters of the right to associate for religious purposes, but
it has made it clear that the right to expressive association is a derivative right, which has been implied
from the First Amendment in order to assure that those rights expressly secured by that amendment can
be meaningfully exercised. Thus, there is no constitutional right to associate for a purpose that is not
protected by the First Amendment.” (internal citations omitted)). But see Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 274 F.3d 377, 396 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the First
Amendment “protects the entertainers and audience members’ right to free expressive association” at
an adult establishment because “[t]hey are certainly engaged in a collective effort on behalf of shared
goals” and “[t]he dancers and customers work together as speaker and audience to create an erotic,
sexually-charged atmosphere, and although society may not find that a particularly worthy goal, it is a
shared one nonetheless”).
139
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. Brennan also emphasized that “[t]here can be no clearer example of
an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group
to accept members it does not desire.” Id.
140
The most commonly asserted elements of the test require that a statute subject to strict scrutiny
must be narrowly tailored and use the least restrictive means to further a compelling government
interest. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(summarizing the strict scrutiny test); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492
U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (finding that protecting the psychological and physical wellbeing of minors is a
compelling government interest, but that the government must still choose the least restrictive means to
further said interest); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978) (noting that a stateimposed restriction on corporate speech cannot stand in the absence of a compelling state interest).
141
It is worth noting that in the twenty-five years since Roberts, the Court has never elaborated on
its “significantly less restrictive” language and has cited it only four times, twice in footnotes. See
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 (2010) (quoting Roberts for this language);
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (same); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 388 n.3 (2000) (same); Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 n.11
(1986) (same).
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scrutiny, his only formulation of the legal test proposed a different
standard, and, unsurprisingly, some courts have construed Roberts as
intending something less than strict scrutiny.143
C. The Problems with “Nonexpressive” Association
Brennan’s rendering of the constitutional test for regulations impinging
upon expressive association was not the only problem with his analysis.
His category of expressive association implied that some associations were
“nonexpressive.”144 The problems with this line-drawing are not merely
doctrinal—they are philosophical as well.145 The purported distinction
between expressive and nonexpressive association fails to recognize that:
(1) all associations have expressive potential; (2) meaning is dynamic; and
(3) meaning is subject to more than one interpretation. These three claims
rely on hermeneutical arguments whose full consideration exceeds the
scope of this Article and which are addressed here in summary fashion.146

142
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (noting that the state achieved its interest through “the least
restrictive means”); id. at 628 (finding that the “incidental abridgment” of protected speech “[was] not
greater than [was] necessary”). Four Justices later equated the Roberts test of “means significantly less
restrictive” to strict scrutiny. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that
eliminating discrimination is a compelling government interest, and observing that the court in Roberts
“held that Minnesota’s law [was] the least restrictive means of achieving [the state’s compelling]
interest”). Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens’s dissent. Id. at 663. But in
some ways, Dale only adds to the ambiguity of the test the Court applies in freedom of association
cases. See id. at 658–59 (rejecting “the intermediate standard of review enunciated in United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968),” but noting that under the proper analysis, “the associational interest in
freedom of expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the State’s interest on the other”).
143
See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Roberts does not require the
government to exhaust every possible means of furthering its interest; rather, the government must
show only that its interest ‘cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623)); Chi Iota Colony of
Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The mere fact
that the associational interest asserted is recognized by the First Amendment does not necessarily mean
that a regulation which burdens that interest must satisfy strict scrutiny.”); Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub.
Educ., 809 F.2d 1546, 1559 n.26 (11th Cir. 1987) (describing a “balancing of interests” (quoting
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623)); Every Nation Campus Ministries v. Achtenberg, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1075,
1083 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (“‘[S]tate action that burdens a group’s ability to engage in expressive
association [need not] always be subject to strict scrutiny, even if the group seeks to engage in
expressive association through a limited public forum.’” (quoting Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d
634, 652 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fisher, J., concurring))); cf. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v.
Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 247 (3d. Cir. 2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (describing Roberts as having
announced a “balance-of-interests test”).
144
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence explicitly refers to “nonexpressive association.” See Roberts,
468 U.S. at 638 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court’s case law recognizes radically different
constitutional protections for expressive and nonexpressive associations.”).
145
Cf. Epstein, supra note 27, at 122 (arguing that the distinction between expressive and
nonexpressive association “is indefensible both as a matter of political theory and constitutional law”).
146
For the kind of argument on which these claims are based, see generally LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell & Mott,
Ltd. 3d ed. 1958) (1953).
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1. The Ubiquity of Expressive Association
The first problem with “nonexpressive association” is that every
association—and every associational act—has expressive potential.
Expressive meaning comes through the performance of communal acts,
and communicative possibility exists in joining, excluding, gathering,
proclaiming, engaging, or not engaging.147 Once an association is
stipulated between two or more people, almost any associative act by those
people—when consciously undertaken as members of the association—has
expressive potential reflective of that association.148
Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk reject this capacious
understanding of expressive meaning in their consideration of Dale.149 For
example, they assert that “[t]he membership of an association is not
inherently expressive in the way that the membership of a parade
is . . . .”150 But this is not always the case—membership in the Ku Klux
Klan likely conveys greater expressivism than marching in the Macy’s
Thanksgiving Day Parade.151
Chemerinsky and Fisk make a related error when they propose a
speech-based remedy for the Boy Scouts in a world in which the Court had
decided Dale differently. They argue that even if the Scouts had been
forced to include James Dale as part of its association,
[it] easily could proclaim to the world that it is anti-gay and
that it was accepting gay scoutleaders, like James Dale,
because the law required it to do so. In other words, the Boy
Scouts could use the forced inclusion of homosexuals as the
occasion for making clear its anti-gay message, and that the
inclusion of Dale was a result of legal compulsion and not a

147
Cf. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Even the training of outdoor survival
skills or participation in community service might become expressive when the activity is intended to
develop good morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement.”).
148
The claim is intentionally broad—it is difficult to envision any associative act that lacks
expressive potential. William Marshall posits a counterexample: “Tom and Fred walking down the
street is, in no meaningful sense, expression.” Marshall, supra note 36, at 77. But as long as Tom and
Fred’s stroll reflects a conscious decision to walk with one another, then the act of walking may
express a kind of shared (though perhaps fleeting) affiliation. The meaning of that expression will vary
based upon the surrounding circumstances. Consider, for example, the expressive meaning if Tom is
black and Fred is white and they are walking merrily down the main street of a small southern town in
the 1950s.
149
Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 600–04 (2001).
150
Id. at 604. Chemerinsky and Fisk make the comment in an attempt to distinguish Dale from
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 578 (1995).
Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 149, at 604.
151
Cf. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 149, at 599 (“[T]he Klan likely could exclude African
Americans or the Nazi party could exclude Jews because discrimination is a key aspect of their
message.”).
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Chemerinsky and Fisk’s proposal assumes that policy statements made
by the Boy Scouts will perfectly mitigate the direct and indirect expressive
effects of Dale’s forced inclusion. But once we recognize that expressive
meaning extends beyond words, there is no guarantee that words alone will
restore an expressive equilibrium. For example, the Scouts might be
forced to adjust their policy statement about homosexuality in a way that is
suboptimal to their associational purposes and beliefs. It is also possible
that the Scouts could believe that no words or statements would adequately
disavow the symbolic meaning of Dale’s forced inclusion in their group.
To illustrate further why the category of expressive association fails to
encompass the broader understanding of meaning suggested in this Article,
consider a gay social club.153 Suppose that the club has twenty members,
placing it well outside of the currently recognized contours of an intimate
association. Suppose further that the club’s members engage in no verbal
or written expression directed outside of their gatherings but make no
effort to conceal their membership from their friends, colleagues, and
acquaintances who are not part of the club. There is no way that the
members of this club are engaging in “a right to associate for the purpose
of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion.”154 And yet there is clearly an expressive message in their very
act of gathering.155
2. Meaning Is Dynamic
The second problem with the reasoning underlying expressive
association is that meaning is dynamic. The messages, creeds, practices,
152

Id. at 603.
See Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 2, at 11 (emphasizing that “many exclusively gay
social and activity clubs, retreats, vacations, and professional organizations” have “relied on
exclusively gay environments in which to feel safe, to build relationships, and to develop political
strategy” (quoting Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1550).
154
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). I assume here that Justice Brennan’s
conception of assembly is a narrow and historically decontextualized one. For an alternative vision of
assembly, see infra Part VII.
155
Provided, of course, that at least one person external to the group is aware of the gathering.
The expressiveness inherent in an act of gathering presupposes an audience of some kind. Thus, for
example, the gathering of a secret society would not have an outward expressiveness. Cf. Melville B.
Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 36
(1973) (“The right to engage in verbal locutions which no one can hear and in conduct which no one
can observe may sometimes qualify as a due process ‘liberty,’ but without an actual or potential
audience there can be no first amendment speech right.”). While Nimmer’s observation may be
formally correct, it makes little difference in the application of an expressive restriction. Any act of
self-expression (for example, expression undertaken without an actual or potential audience) becomes
communicative when the state attempts to restrict it. The very determination by a government actor
that an act is not “communicative” or not “protected” is an interpretation of the meaning of the act that
creates an audience in the government actor restricting the act.
153
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and even the central purposes of associations change over time. Justice
Souter missed this reality when he argued in his Dale dissent that “no
group can claim a right of expressive association without identifying a
clear position to be advocated over time in an unequivocal way.”156 That
standard proves too much. What would it mean for a group to advocate a
“clear position” “over time” in “an unequivocal way”?157
3. Meaning Is Subject to More than One Interpretation
The final problem with the idea of expressive association is that
meaning is subject to more than one interpretive gloss.158 Acknowledging
the subjective interpretation of meaning exposes a related problem inherent
in the “message-based” approach of the expressive association doctrine:
who decides what counts as the message of the group? Chemerinsky and
Fisk criticize the Supreme Court in Dale for unduly deferring to the Boy
Scouts’ leadership’s views about the group’s expressive message.159 But
there is not a readily apparent alternative that more “justly” or “accurately”
captures the group’s expressive meaning. For example, it is not obvious
that a majority of the group’s members should be recognized as having the
authoritative interpretation of the group’s meaning, particularly for
156

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 701 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Even “[t]he ‘message’ conveyed by a monument may change over time.” Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 (2009). The character of an organization or association may
likewise change over time:
[T]he line between commercial associations and political organizations is not easily
drawn, nor can one predict when a commercial association will metamorphose into
an important expressive association. For example, America’s most powerful
lobbying organization, the American Association of Retired Persons, began as a
commercial association organized to sell health care products to the elderly, and still
has substantial business interests.
David E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 133, 183
[hereinafter Bernstein, Sex Discrimination].
158
Cf. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS, supra note 5, at 6 (“There are always alternative
understandings of an association’s nature and purpose, and competing classifications.”). Justice Alito
recently made a similar observation about monuments:
Even when a monument features the written word, the monument may be intended
to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety
of ways. . . .
. . . [T]ext-based monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts and
sentiments in the minds of different observers, and the effect of monuments that do
not contain text is likely to be even more variable.
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135.
At least three of the other Dale justices appear to share Souter’s view. Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer joined Souter’s dissent. 530 U.S. at 702. Justice Stevens made a similar claim in his dissent.
Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Equally important is BSA’s failure to adopt any clear position on
homosexuality. BSA’s temporary, though ultimately abandoned, view that homosexuality is
incompatible with being ‘morally straight’ and ‘clean’ is a far cry from the clear, unequivocal statement
necessary to prevail on its claim.”).
159
See Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 149, at 600 (arguing that the Court’s holdings in Dale
“will allow any group that wants to discriminate to do so by claiming . . . a desire to exclude based on
any characteristics that it chooses”).
157
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hierarchically structured groups.
And as Andrew Koppelman has
suggested, “it is unseemly, and potentially abusive, for courts to tell
organizations—particularly organizations with dissenting political views—
what their positions are.”161
The challenges to determining a group’s meaning get even thornier.
Consider three different characterizations that Chemerinsky and Fisk offer
about the purposes of the Boy Scouts: (1) a “significant number of current
and former scouts . . . reasonably believed that scouting was, and should
be, about camping”;162 (2) all members of the Boy Scouts understand that
“the Boy Scouts is for boys,” and “[a]ll presumably believe that same sex
experiences offer valuable developmental opportunities for children”;163
and (3) “we suspect [that] Boy Scouts of America is understood [by its
members] to be about honesty, self-reliance, service, leadership, and
camping.”164 These descriptions are not interchangeable. They assign
different purposes to the Boy Scouts (camping vs. gender-based activities
vs. camping plus other things), they attribute those purposes to different
subsets of the association (a significant number of current and former
scouts vs. all members vs. members), and they attach varying degrees of
certainty to the asserted meaning (the belief was “reasonable” vs. all
members “presumably believed” vs. the belief is something that
Chemerinsky and Fisk “suspect”). All of these variations and their varying
rhetorical emphases spring from the description of a single association in a
single law review article. It is not hard to see how the interpretive
dilemmas multiply when assertions of purpose and meaning are expanded
ever further. These interminable inquiries into what counts as the
expressive message of a group are artificially imposed by the artificial
distinction between expressive and nonexpressive associations.
4. The Limits of Expression
Once we acknowledge the multivalent expression inherent in group
activity, we can no longer easily label some groups as “nonexpressive.” It
might be argued that this claim runs afoul of basic First Amendment
doctrine. For example, in United States v. O’Brien, the seminal case on
symbolic speech, the Court rejected “the view that an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging
160

For examples of groups whose meaning and message are not determined by majority vote, see
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States . . . .”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 613 (1984) (“The ultimate policymaking
authority of the Jaycees rests with an annual national convention, consisting of delegates from each
local chapter, with a national president and board of directors,” instead of by a majority vote of the
entire membership).
161
KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at 24.
162
Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 149, at 608.
163
Id. at 609.
164
Id. at 611.
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in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”
But the Court has
itself undermined this distinction with its expansive embrace of the concept
of symbolic speech, and interpreting O’Brien’s parsing of speech and
conduct too mechanically is “doomed to failure.”166 All that the purported
definitional limitation on “speech” means is that some conduct can be
regulated based upon its content or harm irrespective of whether it has an
expressive component.167 Thus, the Court acknowledges the expressive
dimensions of dancing naked168 and sleeping in a park169 even as it
endorses the government’s proscription of those activities. Of course, as
these examples illustrate, not every expressive act warrants constitutional
protection: defining what constitutes expression differs from determining
the scope of legal protection. Recognizing the expressive potential of
associations tells us nothing about whether they will be constitutionally
protected. But it prevents those who exercise coercive power over our
lives from avoiding a meaningful weighing of constitutional values simply
by classifying some groups as “nonexpressive.”170
V. THE COST TO THE JAYCEES
The preceding two sections have traced the developments leading to
the Court’s recognition of the categories of intimate and expressive
association in Roberts and identified the problems with these categories.
This section explores how the Court’s use of intimate and expressive
association in Roberts illegitimately rejected the associational claims of the
165

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
See Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 110 (1989) (“[The] attempt to distinguish
between speech and conduct is doomed to failure.”).
167
Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (“We have sometimes said that
[certain] categories of expression are ‘not within the area of constitutionally protected speech,’ or that
the ‘protection of the First Amendment does not extend’ to them. Such statements must be taken in
context, however, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand
characterizing obscenity ‘as not being speech at all.’ What they mean is that these areas of speech can,
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable
content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the
Constitution . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
168
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (“[N]ude dancing of the kind
sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment,
though we view it as only marginally so.”).
169
See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (assuming that
“overnight sleeping” in a park, as an act of protest, might be expression covered by the First
Amendment but upholding a ban on overnight sleeping as a content-neutral restriction).
170
The Supreme Court occasionally evades this distinction. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (claiming that “we have extended First
Amendment protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive”). Commenting upon this sentence
in FAIR, Dale Carpenter rightly notes that the Court “cites no precedent for this conclusion or for the
phrase ‘inherently expressive.’ No prior majority opinion on the subject has suggested that in deciding
whether conduct is expressive we should look only at the conduct itself, rather than at both the conduct
and the context in which it occurs.” Dale Carpenter, Unanimously Wrong, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
217, 243 (2006).
166
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Jaycees. It first considers Justice Brennan’s unconvincing focus on the
size, seclusion, and selectivity of the Jaycees in his attempt to cast the
group as nonintimate. It then turns to the ways in which both Brennan and
Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence, characterized the purpose and
activities of the Jaycees in denying the group protection as an expressive
association.
A. Size, Seclusion, Selectivity, and the Specter of Segregation
After distinguishing between intimate and nonintimate associations,
Justice Brennan attempted to determine where an association’s “objective
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most
attenuated of personal attachments.”171 He defined an intimate association
as “distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of
selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion
from others in critical aspects of the relationship.”172 He noted that factors
relevant to determining intimacy include “size, purpose, policies,
selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case
may be pertinent.”173 The size of an association is critical to Brennan’s
argument. He had reported in the first part of his opinion that the Jaycees
was a 295,000-member organization.174 In considering whether the group
was an intimate association, he observed that even “the local chapters of
the Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups.”175
The
Minneapolis chapter, for example, had “approximately 430 members.”176
These figures are meant to persuade the reader that the Jaycees clearly falls
outside of the bounds of an intimate association. But Brennan’s numbers
also deflect attention away from the actual relationships that undoubtedly
formed in local chapters of the large national organization. It is hard to
imagine the Minneapolis Jaycees coming together in meetings, social
events, charitable activities, and planning sessions without meaningful
interaction between members, including some that led to close friendships
171

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
Id. at 620. Brennan continued: “As a general matter, only relationships with these sorts of
qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of
association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.” Id.
173
Id. Brennan’s appeal to “other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent” has
not offered a very clear judicial test for defining the contours of intimate association. As Justice
Stevens noted in his Dale dissent, “the precise scope of the right to intimate association is unclear.”
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n.26 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Udell,
supra note 83, at 239–40 (describing the “chaos” of lower court attempts to construe intimate
association and noting “myriad tests, even within the same circuit”). But see supra note 84 and
accompanying text (suggesting that courts have found most associations to be nonintimate).
174
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613 (“At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with [fifty-one] state
organizations.”).
175
Id. at 621.
176
Id.
172
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and personal bonds.
Brennan’s focus on lack of seclusion as an indicator of intimacy is also
problematic. He critiqued the Jaycees because women and nonmembers—
“strangers,” actually—were present at the group’s events:
[W]omen affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings,
participate in selected projects, and engage in many of the
organization’s social functions. Indeed, numerous
nonmembers of both genders regularly participate in a
substantial portion of activities central to the decision of
many members to associate with one another, including many
of the organization’s various community programs, awards
ceremonies, and recruitment meetings. In short, the local
chapters of the Jaycees are neither small nor selective.
Moreover, much of the activity central to the formation and
maintenance of the association involves the participation of
strangers to that relationship.177
These assertions raise a number of questions. How does Brennan
know which activities were “central to the decision of many members to
associate with one another”? Similarly, on what basis can he purport to
know “the activity central to the formation and maintenance of the
association”?178 Even if he were capable of making these determinations,
what is the significance of the fact that “strangers” participated in “various
community programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meetings”?179
Isn’t this the case with many associations that rent conference space, enlist
professional fundraisers, or cater their events?180
Brennan’s least convincing argument in his attempt to characterize the
Jaycees as nonintimate was his focus on the group’s lack of selectivity. He
distinguished the Kiwanis Club from the Jaycees because the Kiwanis had
“a formal procedure for choosing members on the basis of specific and
selective criteria” while the Jaycees looked only at gender and age.181 That
distinction seems strained, and it also calls into question the relationship
between selectivity and intimacy. Book clubs, gardening clubs, and some
recreational sports leagues are often less selective than the Jaycees in their
177

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
179
Id.
180
Cf. id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“No association is likely ever to be exclusively
engaged in expressive activities, if only because it will collect dues from its members or purchase
printing materials or rent lecture halls or serve coffee and cakes at its meetings.”). One might also
wonder exactly which “local chapters of the Jaycees” Brennan is describing, given that the Minneapolis
and St. Paul Jaycees already admitted women as full members. Id. at 627 (majority opinion).
181
Id. at 621, 630. In fact, the Jaycees looked at more than gender and age. See U.S. Jaycees v.
McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1571–72 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that the St. Paul bylaws required that
applicants be of “good character and reputation”).
178
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membership requirements, but they can foster intimate connections among
their members.
Brennan’s focus on selectivity did, however, establish a link between
the Jaycees and segregationist groups.182 To support his contention that
“the local chapters of the Jaycees are large and basically unselective
groups,”183 Brennan cited three cases: Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass’n,184 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,185 and Daniel v.
Paul.186 But the problem with Tillman, Sullivan, and Daniel wasn’t that
they employed a single membership criterion. It was that the criterion was:
(1) race; (2) used by whites to exclude blacks; (3) in membership groups
closely tied to housing (Tillman and Sullivan) or created as an obvious
sham (Daniel); (4) in the midst of the Civil Rights Era. The constitutional
rationale underlying these cases wasn’t that unselective groups lacked an
intimacy worthy of constitutional protection but that: (1) their lack of
selectivity factored against qualifying under the public club exception to
the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and
(2) “the exclusion of Negroes from white communities” reflected “the
badges and incidents of slavery.”187
Toward the end of his Roberts’s opinion, Brennan revisited the
connection between the Jaycees and segregationist groups:
[E]ven if enforcement of the [Minnesota] Act causes some
incidental abridgment of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the
State’s legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of
invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly
available goods, services, and other advantages cause
unique evils that government has a compelling interest to
prevent—wholly apart from the point of view such conduct
may transmit. Accordingly, like violence or other types of
potentially expressive activities that produce special harms
distinct from their communicative impact, such practices are
entitled to no constitutional protection. In prohibiting such
practices, the Minnesota Act therefore “responds precisely to
the substantive problem which legitimately concerns” the
182

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621 (citing Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, Inc., 410 U.S.
431, 438 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969); Daniel v. Paul, 395
U.S. 298, 302 (1969)). Andrew Koppelman and Tobias Wolff’s recent book employs a similar
approach. See KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at 6 (“The libertarian right to exclude, then, is
racist at the core.”).
183
468 U.S. at 621.
184
410 U.S. 431 (1973).
185
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
186
395 U.S. 298 (1969).
187
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441–42 (1968).
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State and abridges no more speech or associational freedom
than is necessary to accomplish that purpose.188
Notice the italicized language. It adds little to Brennan’s analysis of
whether Minnesota’s Act was narrowly tailored and minimally intrusive
(the doctrinal focus of the paragraph). In fact, it contradicts that analysis,
asserting that the Jaycees’s desire to limit the participation of women was
“entitled to no constitutional protection.”189 If the right of expressive
association was “plainly implicated in this case,”190 then it clearly enjoyed
some constitutional protection. Brennan’s citation to Runyon is also
problematic. His pincite tags Stewart’s distinction between belief and
practice, which rested on the view that “even some private discrimination
is subject to special remedial legislation in certain circumstances under § 2
of the Thirteenth Amendment.”191 Stewart relied on the Thirteenth
Amendment in this passage not as a source of congressional power but for
the direct authority to interfere with some forms of private discrimination.
That raises the question of whether the principle announced in Runyon
trumps a right of association claim in cases involving discrimination not
based on race.192 Brennan never explained how remedying the “unique
evils” in Runyon (rooted in the “badges and incidents of slavery”) provided
a legal justification for destroying the Jaycees for their gender-based
discrimination.
Whether he intended it or not, the real force of Brennan’s references to
Runyon and “invidious discrimination” was the visceral emotion that they
stirred, equating the Jaycees’s position to the racism of segregation.193 The
Jaycees had warned of this danger in its brief to the Court:
Sprinkled throughout the opposing briefs are references
to “invidious discrimination” as applied to the Jaycees’ allmale policy. The term is used in such cases as Runyon v.
McCrary and Gilmore v. City of Montgomery against a
backdrop of racial discrimination. The use of this term is
188
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628–29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting City Council of
L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984)). Both Roberts and the Civil Rights cases
Brennan cited stretched the meaning of “public accommodation” to bring private activity within the
reach of the relevant statutes.
189
Id. at 628.
190
Id. at 622.
191
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 175–76 (1976).
192
Cf. William Buss, Discrimination by Private Clubs, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 815, 826 (1989) (“The
thirteenth amendment, then, seems a fully adequate power to prevent race discrimination and race-like
discrimination, but it is not a likely candidate as a source of federal legislative power for preventing
private club discrimination on the basis of sex.”).
193
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628; cf. Bernstein, Expressive Association, supra note 24, at 200–01
(“Brennan characterized the Jaycees’ discriminatory practices as akin to violence and not worthy of
constitutional protection, and therefore gave the right of expressive association short shrift in his
compelling interest analysis.”).
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apparently intended to suggest that the Jaycees’ all-male
membership policy is somehow immoral and unsavory and
therefore not entitled to protection against the State’s police
powers.194
Yet rather than heed this warning, Brennan embraced the comparison,
writing the “stigmatizing injury [of discrimination], and the denial of equal
opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons
suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated
differently because of their race.”195 In one sense, the claim is correct—the
kind of exclusion in which the Jaycees engaged is undoubtedly hurtful and
stigmatizing to some people. But we ought to pause before accepting
Brennan’s specific application of the general principle. It is not clear that
the circumstances facing women in Minneapolis in 1984 were on the same
order of those facing African Americans in Montgomery in 1974, or that
the judicial remedies in these situations would have accomplished
objectives of similar magnitude, and these differences may well have
mattered had Brennan engaged in a meaningful weighing of constitutional
values.
B. Monolithic Meaning
The Court’s treatment of the Jaycees in Roberts also illustrates the thin
protections of expressive association when expression is narrowly
construed. Justice Brennan contended that the Jaycees “failed to
demonstrate that the Act impose[d] any serious burdens on the male
members’ freedom of expressive association.”196 He dismissed as “sexual
stereotyping” the Jaycees’ argument that allowing women to vote “will
change the content or impact of the organization’s speech.”197 Judge
194

Brief of Appellee at *23, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 237 [hereinafter Brief of Appellee] (internal citations omitted).
195
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625.
196
Id. (emphasis added). The assertion is indefensible. See SOIFER, supra note 24, at 40 (“Surely
the Jaycees . . . will be a different organization [after admitting women with voting rights]. Surely that
difference will be felt throughout an intricate web of relationships and different voices in immeasurable
but nonetheless significant ways.”); Richard W. Garnett, Jaycees Reconsidered: Judge Richard S.
Arnold and the Freedom of Association, 58 ARK. L. REV. 587, 597 n.53 (2005) (“[I]f the application of
the Human Rights Act really imposed no ‘serious burdens’ on the freedom of expressive association, it
is not clear why the Act’s application should require justification under the Court’s strict-scrutiny
methodology.”); Kateb, supra note 24, at 55 (“Brennan’s claim that young women may, after their
compulsory admission, contribute to the allowable purpose of ‘promoting the interests of young men’
is absurd.”); Rosenblum, Compelled Association, supra note 87, at 78 (“The Jaycees’ ‘voice’ was
undeniably altered once it was forced to admit young women as full members along with young
men.”). But see Sunder, supra note 24, at 539 (“In Roberts and the cases immediately following it, the
balance between liberty and equality swung in favor of equality interests because the associations at
issue offered no evidence of any expressive message that would be threatened by inclusion of the
plaintiffs.”).
197
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628. Richard Garnett suggests that some of Brennan’s “assertions sound
dated today, like the kind of things one might have expected from an elderly, well-meaning, liberal
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Richard Arnold’s reasoning in the court below provides a useful contrast:
If the statute is upheld, the basic purpose of the Jaycees will
change. It will become an association for the advancement of
young people. . . .
....
[S]ome change in the Jaycees’ philosophical cast can
reasonably be expected. It is not hard to imagine, for
example, that if women become full-fledged members in any
substantial numbers, it will not be long before efforts are
made to change the Jaycee Creed. Young women may take a
dim view of affirming the “brotherhood of man,” or declaring
how “free men” can best win economic justice. Such phrases
are not trivial. The use of language betrays an attitude of
mind, even if unconsciously, and that attitude is part of the
belief and expression that the First Amendment protects.198
Judge Arnold’s attention to the Jaycees’s expressivism is missing not
only from Brennan’s opinion but also from Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence.199 O’Connor concluded that the Jaycees’s attention to and
success in membership drives meant that it was “first and foremost, an
organization that, at both the national and local levels, promote[d] and
practice[d] the art of solicitation and management.”200 Other language in
her concurrence suggested that:
[A]n association should be characterized as commercial, and
therefore subject to rationally related state regulation of its
membership and other associational activities, when, and
only when, the association’s activities are not predominantly
of the type protected by the First Amendment. It is only
when the association is predominantly engaged in protected
expression that state regulation of its membership will
necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one collective

male jurist eager to say ‘the right thing’ about sex discrimination and stereotypes in the mid-1980s.”
Garnett, supra note 196, at 600.
198
U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1571 (8th Cir. 1983). Garnett offers a more detailed
contrast between Judge Arnold’s reasoning and the Brennan and O’Connor opinions. See generally
Garnett, supra note 196.
199
O’Connor’s concurrence is sometimes viewed more favorably than Brennan’s majority
opinion. See, e.g., Douglas O. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1878, 1896 (1984) (“On balance, the O’Connor approach seems to enjoy several distinct
advantages over the majority approach.”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with
Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 876 (2005) (“Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Jaycees was largely correct.”).
200
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 639 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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voice that would otherwise be heard.

O’Connor’s reasoning is problematic on three counts. First, she posits
a false dichotomy between commercial and expressive associations—
associations can be both commercial and expressive.202 Second, her
requirement that an association be “predominantly engaged”203 in protected
expression to avoid being classified as commercial hurts associations that,
because of their size or unpopularity, must devote a substantial portion of
their activities to fundraising or other commercial activities.204 Finally, she
leaves unclear which activities are “of the type protected by the First
Amendment.”205
Judge Arnold’s opinion offers a very different perspective to
O’Connor’s assertion that the Jaycees was “first and foremost” a
commercial association:
Some of what local chapters do is purely social. They
have parties, with no purpose more complicated than
enjoying themselves. Some of it is civic. They have
conducted a radio fund-raising drive to combat multiple
sclerosis. They have conducted a women’s professional golf
tournament. They have engaged in many other charitable and
educational projects for the public good. (And there is no
claim, incidentally, of any discrimination in the offering to
the public of the benefits of these projects. Money raised to
fight disease, for example, is not used to benefit only male
patients.) And they have advocated, through the years, a
multitude of political and social causes. Governmental
affairs is one of the chief areas of the organization’s activity.
Members on a national, state, and local basis are frequently
meeting, debating issues of public policy, taking more or less
controversial stands, and making opinions known to local,
state, and national officials.206
Arnold further elaborated:
201

Id. at 635–36.
As Larry Alexander notes, “[l]aws regulating membership in any organization—including
commercial ones—will affect the content of that organization’s expression.” Larry Alexander, What Is
Freedom of Association and What Is Its Denial?, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2008).
203
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
204
One of the clearest illustrations of this consequence is the disparate effect of some charitable
solicitation regulation on small or unpopular charities. See John D. Inazu, Making Sense of
Schaumburg: Seeking Coherence in First Amendment Charitable Solicitation Law, 92 MARQ. L. REV.
551, 581–83 (2009) (explaining that, in the area of charitable solicitation, the more burdensome
content-neutral regulations tend to threaten less established charities, and thus endanger their First
Amendment rights).
205
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
206
U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1569 (8th Cir. 1983).
202
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The Jaycees does not simply sell seats in some kind of
personal-development classroom. Personal and business
development, if they come, come not as products bought by
members, but as by-products of activities in which members
engage after they join the organization. These activities are
variously social, civic, and ideological, and some of them fall
within the narrowest view of First Amendment freedom of
association.207
His view is consistent with the Jaycees’ own assertions that they were:
[O]rganized for such educational and charitable purposes as
will promote and foster the growth and development of
young men’s civic organizations in the United States,
designed to inculcate in the individual membership of such
organization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic
interest, and as a supplementary education institution to
provide them with opportunity for personal development and
achievement and an avenue for intelligent participation by
young men in the affairs of their community, state and
nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding
among young men of all nations.208
Parsing which of these activities constitute the group’s “predominate”
activities is a difficult interpretive task, one that neither Brennan nor
O’Connor undertook.209
VI. WHY DOCTRINE MATTERS
The harm of the doctrinal framework in Roberts did not end with the
Jaycees. The categories of intimate and expressive association continue to
shape legal decisions that profoundly affect people’s lives. This section
recounts two more recent examples of groups that have suffered under the
Roberts framework.210 The first is the Chi Iota Colony of the Alpha
207

Id.
Brief of Appellee, supra note 194, at *5.
209
Brennan’s opinion did note that the Jaycees engaged in “protected expression on political,
economic, cultural, and social affairs” and recognized that “the Jaycees regularly engage in a variety of
civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under
the First Amendment.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626–27. But in the very next sentence, he wrote that there
was “no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will
impede the organization’s ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred
views.” Id. at 627.
210
Of course, the case law on freedom of association has changed since Roberts. Some postRoberts cases have affected the doctrinal development of freedom of association in important ways,
most notably Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). See also Rumsfeld v. Forum
for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 68–70 (2006) (refusing to expand the scope of Dale);
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995)
208
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Epsilon Pi fraternity at the College of Staten Island (a nonintimate
nonexpressive association). The second is the student chapter of the
Christian Legal Society at Hastings Law School (a nonintimate expressive
association).
A. The Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi
Alpha Epsilon Pi (“AEPi”) is a national social fraternity founded in
1913 “to provide opportunities for the Jewish college man seeking the best
possible college and fraternity experience.”211 According to its Supreme
Constitution, AEPi seeks “to promote and encourage among its members:
Personal perfection, a reverence for God and an honorable life devoted to
the ideal of service to all mankind; lasting friendships and the attainment of
nobility of action and better understanding among all faiths . . . .”212
In 2002, the Chi Iota Colony (“Chi Iota”) of AEPi formed at the
College of Staten Island.213 Between 2002 and 2005, Chi Iota never had
more than twenty members.214 Its past president described the purpose of
the fraternity as fostering a “lifelong interpersonal bond termed
brotherhood,” which “results in deep attachments and commitments to the
other members of the Fraternity among whom is shared a community of
thoughts, experiences, beliefs and distinctly personal aspects of their
lives.”215 In furtherance of those goals, the fraternity limited its
membership to males.216
Chi Iota applied to be chartered and officially recognized by the
College of Staten Island in March 2004.217 The Director of the Office of
(rejecting, on free speech rather than free association principles, the challenge of a gay, lesbian, and
bisexual group of its exclusion from a city parade); City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 20–21 (1989)
(denying the expressive association claim of the owner of a for-profit skating rink who challenged an
ordinance restricting admission to certain ages); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1, 7–8 (1988) (upholding anti-discrimination laws applied to a consortium of New York City social
clubs); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (upholding antidiscrimination laws applied to the Rotary Club). But the basic premise of this article is that the
categories of intimate and expressive association that began in Roberts remain essentially intact, and it
is in these categories that the most significant doctrinal and theoretical problems surrounding the right
of association remain. Neither Dale nor any of the other post-Roberts cases alters this premise. Cf.
Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute Right To Discriminate?,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 57 (2004) (“Dale is a mess, but the upshot of the mess is that we still
have the old message-based rule of Roberts.”); Shiffrin, supra note 199, at 841 (“The Court’s framing
of the issues [in Dale] grew straight out of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Roberts v. Jaycees.”).
211
Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 374,
376 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Alpha Epsilon Pi’s mission statement).
212
Id. at 377 (quoting Alpha Epsilon Pi’s bylaws).
213
Id. at 376. The College of Staten Island is a primarily commuter campus of just over 11,000
undergraduates.
214
See id. (noting that, at the time of the case in 2005, the fraternity had eighteen members, and
the plaintiffs estimated that membership was unlikely to exceed fifty persons).
215
Id. at 377 (quotation marks omitted).
216
See id. at 379 (explaining the selection and initiation process for prospective members).
217
Id. at 380.
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Student Life denied the application on the basis that the fraternity’s
exclusion of women violated the college’s nondiscrimination policy.218
The denial of official recognition precluded Chi Iota from using the
college’s facilities, resources, and funding, as well as from using the
college’s name in conjunction with the group’s name, and from posting
events to the college’s calendars.219
In 2005, the members of Chi Iota filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, arguing violations of their
rights to intimate and expressive association and to equal protection.220
The district court granted the fraternity’s motion for a preliminary
injunction against the college on its intimate association claim but
concluded that Chi Iota had not shown a clear or substantial likelihood of
success on its expressive association claim.221 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s grant
of a preliminary injunction and remanded the case, noting that the
fraternity’s “interests in intimate association are relatively weak.”222
Although the district court would still have had Chi Iota’s intimate and
expressive association claims before it on remand, neither looked to have a
reasonable chance of success given the posture of the litigation. As the
Second Circuit was considering the case, the Chi Iota Colony of the Alpha
Epsilon Pi Fraternity at the College of Staten Island disbanded.223
Chi Iota is not the most sympathetic plaintiff to bring a freedom of
association claim. Although its Jewish roots suggested religious freedom
interests, most of its members were nonpracticing Jews.224 It was a social
group, but some of its social activities were coarse and banal, including
visits to strip clubs.225 It may well be that the brothers of Chi Iota were a
self-focused, hedonistic group of boys who brought a collective drain on
whatever community existed at the mostly commuter campus at the
College of Staten Island.226
218

Id.
Id. at 380; cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) (“There can be no doubt that denial of
official recognition, without justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges [the right of
individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs].”).
220
Chi Iota, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 381.
221
Id. at 389, 395.
222
Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 149 (2d
Cir. 2007).
223
E-mail from Gregory F. Hauser, to author (Sept. 30, 2009) (on file with author and
Connecticut Law Review). Mr. Hauser represented Chi Iota in the litigation.
224
See Chi Iota, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 378 (quoting Chi Iota’s president, explaining that the
fraternity members were “not extremely religious, but [did] talk about [their contributions] to the
community, an expression of Judaism”).
225
Chi Iota, 502 F.3d at 141.
226
Of course, the brothers of Chi Iota may also have had many endearing characteristics,
especially to one another. As David Bernstein notes:
[M]any believe that college fraternity and sorority members experience a “special
camaraderie” that would not exist if members of the opposite sex were included.
219
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But all of this is beside the point. Associational protections should not
turn on whether a group’s purposes or activities are sincere or wholesome
to an outsider’s perspective. The group’s practices and activities meant
something to the brothers of Chi Iota. They meant enough for the brothers
to pursue membership through an application and rush process, to
participate in the group’s activities, and to bring a federal lawsuit in an
attempt to preserve their associational bonds.
B. The Christian Legal Society at Hastings Law School
The Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) is a “nationwide association of
lawyers, law students, law professors, and judges who profess faith in
Jesus Christ.”227 Founded in 1961, its purposes include “providing a
means of society, fellowship, and nurture among Christian lawyers;
encouraging, discipling, and aiding Christian law students; promoting
justice, religious liberty, and biblical conflict resolution; and encouraging
lawyers to furnish legal services to the poor.”228 CLS maintains student
chapters at many law schools around the country.229 These student
chapters invite anyone to participate in their events but require members—
including officers—to sign a Statement of Faith consistent with the
Protestant evangelical and Catholic traditions.230 Part of this Statement of
Faith affirms that sexual conduct should be confined to heterosexual
marriage. Accordingly, CLS student chapters do not accept as members
anyone who engaged in or affirmed the morality of sex outside of
heterosexual marriage.231
In 2004, the CLS chapter at Hastings Law School in San Francisco
inquired about becoming a recognized student organization.232 Hastings
officials withheld recognition because CLS’s Statement of Faith violated
the religion and sexual orientation provisions of the school’s

For young people especially, the presence of the opposite sex in a social setting is
likely to create sexual tension and concern for one’s appearance, making it harder
for them to relax and to get away from the pressure and stress of everyday life.
Bernstein, Sex Discrimination, supra note 157, at 186–87.
227
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Newton,
No. 08-1371 (S. Ct. May 5, 2009).
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
231
See id. at 8 (“In view of the clear dictates of Scripture, unrepentant participation in or
advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is inconsistent with an affirmation of the Statement of Faith,
and consequently may be regarded by CLS as disqualifying such an individual from CLS
membership.” (internal quotation marks omitted). CLS specifies that “[a] person’s mere experience of
same-sex or opposite-sex sexual attraction does not determine his or her eligibility for leadership or
voting membership,” but “CLS individually addresses each situation that arises in a sensitive Biblical
fashion.” Id.
232
Id.
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Nondiscrimination Policy.
As a result, the school denied CLS travel
funds and funding from student activity fees.234 It also denied them the use
of the school’s logo, use of a Hastings e-mail address, the opportunity to
send mass e-mails to the student body, participation in the annual student
organizations fair, and reserved meeting spaces on campus.235 Hastings
subsequently asserted that its denial of recognition stemmed from an
“accept-all-comers” policy that required any student organization to accept
any student who desired to be a member of the organization.236
CLS filed suit in federal district court asserting violations of expressive
association, free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection.237
In Christian Legal Society v. Kane, the court granted summary judgment
against CLS on all of its claims.238 With respect to CLS’s expressive
association claim, the court concluded that Roberts and Dale were
inapplicable because “CLS is not being forced, as a private entity, to
include certain members or officers” and “the conditioned exclusion of
[an] organization from a particular forum [does] not rise to the level of
compulsive membership.”239 The court also asserted that “Hastings has
denied CLS official recognition based on CLS’s conduct—its refusal to
comply with Hastings’s Nondiscrimination Policy—not because of CLS’s
philosophies or beliefs.”240
Despite resting its holding on the inapplicability of Roberts and Dale,
the court held in the alternative that CLS’s claim failed under those
233

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
235
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL
997217, at *17 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 227, at 10.
Hastings did not deny CLS the “use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes,”
which the Supreme Court has called “[t]he primary impediment to free association flowing from
nonrecognition.” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972). Still, nothing in Healy suggests that the
lack of access to campus facilities for meetings is the only burden caused by nonrecognition, and it is
not hard to see how the inability to reserve meeting spaces, to access e-mail lists, or to participate in
student fairs could burden associational freedoms:
Petitioners’ associational interests also were circumscribed by the denial of the
use of campus bulletin boards and the school newspaper. If an organization is to
remain a viable entity in a campus community in which new students enter on a
regular basis, it must possess the means of communicating with these students.
Moreover, the organization’s ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of
campus debate, and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the
customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and
other students. Such impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.
Id. at 181–82 (footnote omitted).
236
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).
237
Kane, 2006 WL 997217, at *4.
238
The district court granted leave for a group called Hastings Outlaw to intervene in the case.
Outlaw asserted that its members had a right to be officers and voting members in any other campus
group (including CLS) and that its members opposed their student activity fees funding an organization
that they found offensive. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 227, at 10–11.
239
Kane, 2006 WL 997217, at *15 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir.
2003)).
240
Id. at *17.
234
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authorities as well. It assumed that CLS qualified as an expressive
association because Hastings did not dispute that characterization.241 But
the court determined that “CLS has not demonstrated that its ability to
express its views would be significantly impaired by complying with [the
school’s nondiscrimination] requirement.”242 The court concluded:
[U]nlike the Boy Scouts in Dale, CLS has not submitted any
evidence demonstrating that teaching certain values to other
students is part of the organization’s mission or purpose, or
that it seeks to do so by example, such that the mere presence
of someone who does not fully comply with the prescribed
code of conduct would force CLS to send a message contrary
to its mission.243
In fact, the court found “no evidence” that “a non-orthodox Christian, gay,
lesbian, or bisexual student” who became a member or officer of CLS, “by
[his or her] presence alone, would impair CLS’s ability to convey its
beliefs.”244 That conclusion repeats the fallacy in Runyon that forcing
integration on a racist group wouldn’t alter its message and the fallacy in
Roberts that forcing an all-male group to accept women wouldn’t alter its
message.
CLS appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district
court with a terse two-sentence opinion: “The parties stipulate that
Hastings imposes an open membership rule on all student groups—all
groups must accept all comers as voting members even if those individuals
disagree with the mission of the group. The conditions on recognition are
therefore viewpoint neutral and reasonable.”245 CLS petitioned for a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, arguing, among other
things, that the Ninth Circuit’s Kane decision (subsequently restyled as
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez) created a circuit split with a Seventh
Circuit case invalidating the denial of official recognition to a CLS student
chapter at the Southern Illinois University School of Law.246
A divided Supreme Court rejected CLS’s challenge.247 Justice
241
Id. at *20; cf. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2006) (“It would be
hard to argue—and no one does—that CLS is not an expressive association.”).
242
Kane, 2006 WL 997217, at *20.
243
Id. at *22.
244
Id. at *23.
245
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, Christian
Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 795 (2009), aff’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). The court
cited its opinion in Truth v. Kent School District, 542 F.3d 634, 649–50 (9th Cir. 2008), in which it
ruled that a school district could deny recognition to a high school Bible club that limited its voting
members and officers to those who shared the group’s beliefs.
246
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859–60 (7th Cir. 2006).
247
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
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Ginsburg’s majority opinion concluded that Hastings’ all-comers policy
was “a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the studentorganization forum.”248 Justice Alito authored a dissent joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Scalia.249
The majority’s free speech analysis is not entirely persuasive—its
reasoning obscures a tension between the viewpoint neutrality of the allcomers policy (under a public forum analysis) and Hastings’ non-neutral
policy preferences expressed through its own speech and subsidies (under
something akin to a government speech analysis).250 But in the context of
this Article, an even more disturbing aspect of the opinion is the majority’s
failure to take seriously CLS’s freedom of association claim.
From the premise that it “makes little sense to treat CLS’s speech and
association claims as discrete,” Ginsburg concluded that the Court’s
“limited-public-forum precedents supply the appropriate framework for
assessing both CLS’s speech and association rights.”251 The problem with
this doctrinal move is two-fold. First, it essentially elects rational basis
scrutiny over strict scrutiny, and therefore all but preordains the
outcome.252 Second, it casts aside the competing constitutional values
underlying CLS’s freedom of association claim.253
248

Id. at 2978.
Id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 2976 (Hastings’ policy “encourages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among
students” and “conveys the Law School’s decision ‘to decline to subsidize with public monies and
benefits conduct of which the people of California disapprove.’”). In addition to the doctrinal
complications, Martinez involved a disputed factual question as to whether Hastings’ applied an allcomers policy or a policy that prohibited certain kinds of discrimination, including discrimination
based upon religion and sexual orientation. The Court remanded on the question of whether Hastings
selectively applied its all-comers policy. Id. at 2995. While this factual question might be important to
a public forum analysis, it is less relevant to the freedom of association analysis that I believe the Court
should have made. The strength of CLS’s constitutional claim to exist as a group should not turn on
whether the restriction against it is viewpoint neutral or selectively enforced against it.
251
Id.
252
See id. (“[T]he same considerations that have led us to apply a less restrictive level of scrutiny
to speech in limited public forums as compared to other environments apply with equal force to
expressive association occurring in limited public forums.”); id. (“[T]he strict scrutiny we have applied
in some settings to laws that burden expressive association would, in practical effect, invalidate a
defining characteristic of limited public forums—the State may ‘reserv[e] [them] for certain groups’”).
After deciding to pursue a public forum analysis, the viewpoint neutrality of Hastings’ all-comers
policy was self-evident to the majority. See id. at 2993 (“It is, after all, hard to imagine a more
viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers.”); id. (“An allcomers condition on access to RSO status, in short, is textbook viewpoint neutral.”). Accordingly, the
majority “consider[ed] whether Hastings’ policy is reasonable taking into account the RSO forum’s
function and ‘all the surrounding circumstances,’” id. at 2988, and concluded that “the several
justifications Hastings asserts in support of its all-comers requirement are surely reasonable in light of
the RSO forum’s purposes.” Id. at 2991.
253
For example Ginsburg cites an important article by Eugene Volokh. Id. at 2985–86 (citing
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1919, 1940 (2006)). Among other things, Volokh’s article considers a conflict very similar to the one
at issue in Martinez: whether a public university can apply antidiscrimination rules to the Christian
Legal Society. Id. at 1935. Ginsburg highlights Volokh’s observation that a school may limit official
recognition to groups comprised only of students, even though this infringes upon the associational
249
250
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CLS’s associational claim highlights the underlying conflict of values
in this case: the clash between group autonomy and equality, the same
tension at issue in Runyon and Roberts. Taking this values clash seriously
means refusing to make an artificial distinction between expression and
conduct and recognizing that, in some cases, they are one in the same.
Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s insistence that “CLS’s conduct—not its
Christian perspective—is, from Hastings’ vantage point, what stands
between the group and RSO [registered student organization] status,”254
CLS’s “conduct” is inseparable from its message.
Ginsburg’s opinion misses this connection. Quoting from CLS’s brief,
she writes that “expressive association in this case is ‘the functional
equivalent of speech itself’”255 to set up the idea that expressive association
is entitled to no more constitutional protection than speech. But CLS had
asserted:
[W]here one of the central purposes of a noncommercial
expressive association is the communication of a moral
teaching, its choice of who will formulate and articulate that
message is treated as the functional equivalent of speech
itself.256
CLS wasn’t arguing that association is nothing more than speech but
that association is itself a form of expression—who it selects as its
members and leaders communicates a message. CLS underscored this
point elsewhere in its brief, arguing that “[b]ecause a group’s leaders
define and shape the group’s message, the right to select leaders is an
essential element of its right to speak.”257 Ginsburg interpreted this
assertion to mean that “CLS suggests that its expressive-association claim
plays a part auxiliary to speech’s starring role.” 258 That interpretation may
be consistent with the Roberts understanding of expressive association, but
as I have argued throughout this Article, it misses the more fundamental
connection between a group’s message and its composition.
Ginsburg distinguished the Court’s associational cases like Dale and
Roberts because those cases “involved regulations that compelled a group
freedoms of those who wish to form a group with non-students. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986. The
point is a nice one, but the non-student constraint could also be construed as a jurisdictional limit linked
far more closely (and less ideologically) to the nature of the public forum than an all-comers policy.
More importantly, Volokh spends considerable time accounting for the values introduced by the right
of association. Volokh, supra, at 1935. The majority subsumes this dimension into its speech analysis
and avoids the harder questions.
254
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994.
255
Id. at 2984–85 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 35).
256
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 35.
257
Id. at 18.
258
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985 (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 18).
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to include unwanted members, with no choice to opt out.”
But this is
really a matter of perspective. Sometimes a group must choose between
receiving benefits and adhering to its policies at the cost of those
benefits.260 But withholding some benefits—like access to meeting space
or email lists or the opportunity to be part of a public forum—can be akin
to stamping out a group’s existence. After Martinez, the HastingsChristian-Group-that-Accepts-All-Comers can exist, and the ChristianLegal-Society-for-Hastings-Law-Students-that-Can-Sometimes-Meet-onCampus-as-a-Matter-of-University-Discretion-If-Space-Is-Available-butCan’t-Recruit-Members-at-the-Student-Activities-Fair can exist. But the
Hastings Christian Legal Society—whose views and purposes are in no
way sanctioned by and can be explicitly disavowed by Hastings—
cannot.261
VII. REMEMBERING THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY
On the same day that the Court issued its Martinez opinion, it released
its decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago.262 Justice Alito’s opinion in
the latter case observed:
In [United States v. Cruikshank], the Court held that the
general “right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful
purposes,” which is protected by the First Amendment,
applied only against the Federal Government and not against
the states. Nonetheless, over 60 years later the Court held
that the right of peaceful assembly was a “fundamental
righ[t] . . . safeguarded by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.263
It was only the sixth time in the last twenty years that the Court had
even mentioned the right of assembly.264 But this passing nod to a long259

Id. at 2986.
Ginsburg cites Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1984), and Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602–04 (1983).
261
“Official recognition” is a term of art that doesn’t entail any endorsement of private groups by
the state actor. Hastings made clear that it “neither sponsor[]s nor endorse[s]” the views of registered
student organizations and insisted that the groups inform third parties that they were not sponsored by
the law school. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 4.
262
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
263
Id. at 3031 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551–52
(1876) and De Jonge v. Orgeon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937)).
264
Other than McDonald, a majority opinion of the Supreme Court has mentioned the right of
assembly five times in the last twenty years. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705,
2730 (2010) (“Our decisions scrutinizing penalties on simple association or assembly are therefore
inapposite.”); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008) (describing “right of the
people” clause in relation to assembly); id. at 2797 (intimating that assembly and petition are two
separate rights); Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164
(2002) (quoting discussion of free assembly in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539–40 (1945));
260
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forgotten right gestured toward the constitutional framework that should
have decided Martinez and should have protected the Christian Legal
Society.
From the House debates over the Bill of Rights that appealed to
William Penn’s defense of assembly to the rallying cries of the
Democratic-Republican Societies, from the early suffragist and abolitionist
movements of the antebellum era to the labor and civil rights movements
of the Progressive Era, and from the political rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln
to the political rhetoric of Martin Luther King, Jr., the right of assembly
has emphasized the importance of shielding dissident groups from a stateenforced majoritarianism throughout our nation’s history.265 As C. Edwin
Baker has argued, “the function of constitutional rights, and more
specifically the role of the right of assembly, is to protect self-expressive,
nonviolent, noncoercive conduct from majority norms or political
balancing and even to permit people to be offensive, annoying, or
challenging to dominant norms.”266 This role of assembly and its appeal to
groups of different ideologies “makes it a better ‘fit’ than the right of
association within our nation’s legal and political heritage.”267 Indeed,
principles of constitutional interpretation suggest that the First
Amendment’s right of assembly, not the late-arriving and judiciallyconstructed right of association, holds a central place in our constitutional
tradition.268
The importance of assembly is strikingly evident in Justice Brandeis’s
famous opinion in Whitney v. California.269 The now discredited majority
opinion expressed particular concern that Anita Whitney had undertaken
her actions in concert with others, which “involve[d] even greater threat to
the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and acts of

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 (1995) (“The right of free speech, the right
to teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights.” (citation omitted)); United States
v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 476 (1995) (“‘Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly.’” (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376,
(1927))). The last time the Court applied the constitutional right of assembly appears to have been in
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 88 (1982)—twenty-eight years ago.
265
See generally Inazu, Forgotten Freedom, supra note 15 (chronicling the role of assembly in
these historical events and movements).
266
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 134 (1989).
267
Inazu, Forgotten Freedom, supra note 15, at 568. By “fit,” I refer to the ways in which
assembly falls plausibly within our tradition of American constitutionalism. The notion of fit is
intimated in different ways by both Ronald Dworkin and Alasdair MacIntyre. See generally RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY (3d ed. 2007).
268
Philip Bobbitt has suggested that we engage in six modalities of constitutional argument:
textual, structural, prudential, historical, doctrinal, and ethical). PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION xi, 7–8 (1982).
269
274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring). The decision was formally overruled in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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individuals.”
Rejecting this rationale, Brandeis penned some of the most wellknown words in American jurisprudence:
Those who won our independence . . . believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.271
The freedoms of “speech and assembly” lie at the heart of Brandeis’s
argument—the phrase appears eleven times in his brief concurrence. The
Court had linked these two freedoms only once before; after Whitney, the
nexus occurs in over one hundred of its opinions.272 Brandeis’s entwining
of speech and assembly establishes two important connections. First, it
recognizes that a group’s expression includes not only the spoken words of
those assembled but also the expressive message inherent in the group’s
existence. Second, it emphasizes that the rights of speech and assembly
extend across time, preceding the actual moment of expression or
gathering.273 Just as freedom of speech guards against restrictions imposed
prior to an act of speaking, assembly guards against restrictions imposed
prior to an act of assembling—it protects a group’s autonomy,
composition, and existence.274
270

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372.
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J. concurring). Judges and scholars have written volumes about these
words and those that followed, but almost all of them focus on speech alone rather than speech and
assembly. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in the landmark case New York Times v. Sullivan,
deemed Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence the “classic formulation” of the fundamental principle
underlying free speech. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Robert Cover, The Left, the Right, and the
First Amendment: 1918–1928, 40 MD. L. REV. 371 (1981) (“classic statement of free speech”); cf. H.
JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS
194 (2002).
272
The only mention of “speech and assembly” prior to Whitney came in New York ex rel Doyle v.
Atwell, 261 U.S. 590, 591 (1923) (noting that petitioners alleged a deprivation of the “rights of freedom
of speech and assembly”).
273
See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720–25 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. New York, 360 U.S. 684, 697–98 (1959) (Douglas J., dissenting) (“I
can find in the First Amendment no room for any censor whether he is scanning an editorial, reading a
news broadcast, editing a novel or a play, or previewing a movie.”); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395, 423 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“There is no free speech in the sense of the Constitution
when permission must be obtained from an official before a speech can be made. That is a previous
restraint condemned by history and at war with the First Amendment.”).
274
See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (noting that Douds
referred to “the varied forms of governmental action which might interfere with freedom of assembly”
271
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As M. Glenn Abernathy argued in his seminal work, The Right of
Assembly and Association, assembly “need not be artificially narrowed to
encompass only the physical assemblage in a park or meeting hall” but
“can justifiably be extended to include as well those persons who are
joined together through organizational affiliation.”275 Abernathy also
noted that assembly avoids the artificial line-drawing inherent in the right
of association. Writing in 1961, he observed that the Court’s initial
recognition of a constitutional right of association three years earlier had
inserted an instrumental gloss on group autonomy:
It must be noted that [NAACP v. Alabama] does not
clearly extend the First Amendment protection to all lawful
affiliations or organizations. What Justice Harlan discusses
is the association “for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.”
Clearly a vast number of existing associations would fall
within this description, but it is questionable whether the
characterization would fit the purely social club, the garden
club, or perhaps even some kinds of trade or professional
unions.276
As Abernathy noted, this message-based analysis—explicitly
recognized twenty-six years later in Roberts’s category of expressive
association—is absent in the right of assembly: “No such distinction has
been drawn in the cases squarely involving freedom of assembly questions.
The latter cases emphasize that the right extends to any lawful assembly,
without a specific requirement that there be an intention to advance beliefs
and ideas.”277
The right of assembly may thus provide a less arbitrary and more
persuasive framework for protecting dissenting practices than the right of
and concluding that “[c]ompelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of
particular beliefs is of the same order”); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)
(“[T]he fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech or assembly does not
determine the free speech question. Under some circumstances, indirect ‘discouragements’
undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as
imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2010). The principle that assembly encompasses membership is also evident in the now
discredited logic underlying a number of the communist cases decided prior to the Court’s recognition
of the right of association. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79, 84 (D.C.
Cir. 1949) (“[N]othing in the Hatch Act or the loyalty program deprives the Committee or its members
of any property rights. Freedom of speech and assembly is denied no one. Freedom of thought and
belief is not impaired. Anyone is free to join the Committee and give it his support and
encouragement. Everyone has a constitutional right to do these things, but no one has a constitutional
right to be a government employee.”); cf. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950)
(Edgerton, J., dissenting) (“[G]uilt by association . . . denies both the freedom of assembly guaranteed
by the First Amendment and the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth.”).
275
M. GLENN ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 173 (2d ed. rev. 1961).
276
Id. at 236–37 (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. 449).
277
Id. at 237.
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expressive association. Its approach is captured in Justice Rutledge’s
opinion in one of the most important cases on the right of assembly,
Thomas v. Collins.278 Rutledge argued that, because of the “preferred place
given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms
secured by the First Amendment,” only “the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.”279 He
explained:
Where the line shall be placed in a particular application
rests, not on such generalities, but on the concrete clash of
particular interests and the community’s relative evaluation
[of] both of them and of how the one will be affected by the
specific restriction, the other by its absence. That judgment
in the first instance is for the legislative body. But in our
system where the line can constitutionally be placed presents
a question this Court cannot escape answering independently,
whatever the legislative judgment, in the light of our
constitutional tradition. And the answer, under that tradition,
can be affirmative, to support an intrusion upon this domain,
only if grave and impending public danger requires this.280
Justice Rutledge’s opinion also noted that the right of assembly
guarded “not solely religious or political” causes but also “secular causes,”
great and small.281 As Aviam Soifer has suggested, Rutledge’s “dynamic,
relational language” emphasized that the right of assembly was “broad
enough to include private as well as public gatherings, economic as well as
political subjects, and passionate opinions as well as factual statements.”282
Soifer, Rutledge, Abernathy, and Brandeis gesture toward an important
insight about group autonomy. Its primary value is not intimacy or
expressivism—we have other rights, such as privacy and speech, that are
better suited toward those ends. Rather, its primary value is that it permits
dissent to manifest through groups. Justice Brennan glimpsed this value in
Roberts when he noted that “collective effort on behalf of shared goals” is
“especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in
278

323 U.S. 516 (1945).
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531–32 (internal citation omitted).
281
Id. at 531. The “preferred place” language originated in Justice Douglas’s opinion for the
Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943), in which Douglas wrote: “Freedom of
press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”
282
SOIFER, supra note 24, at 77–78; see also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937) (“The
power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the exception rather than the
rule . . . .”); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“[T]he right [of assembly] . . . cannot be
denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
civil and political institutions . . . .”); id. (“The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of
free speech and free press and is equally fundamental . . . .”).
279
280
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shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.”
This
value of dissent entails risk because it strengthens a genuine pluralism
against majoritarian demands for consensus.284 It resists what Nancy
Rosenblum has called the liberal state’s “logic of congruence,” which
requires “that the internal life and organization of associations mirror
liberal democratic principles and practices.”285
Dissenting practices often embody meaning different than that ascribed
to them by outside observers, and “[m]any group expressions are only
made intelligible by the practices that give them meaning.”286 Because
“[c]hallenges to existing values and decisions to embody and express
dissident values are precisely the choices and activities that cannot be
properly evaluated by summations of existing preferences,” the right of
assembly protects “activities that are unreasonable from the perspective of
the existing order.”287 And a group need not lack privilege or status in
283
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 647–48 (2000) (finding that freedom of association is “crucial in preventing the majority
from imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas” (footnote
omitted)).
284
The importance of dissent was downplayed by the “liberal consensus” that formed the
background to the initial recognition of the constitutional right of association in the middle of the
twentieth century. Inazu, Strange Origins, supra note 16, at 541–42, 558 & n.558 (describing the
prominence of mid-twentieth century liberalism that accompanied the Court’s initial framing of the
constitutional right of association). In particular, pluralists like David Truman and Robert Dahl failed
to recognize that “the capacity for groups to maintain autonomous practices, detached from and even
antithetical to the will of the majority, was in some ways a destabilizing freedom. . . . [G]roup
autonomy poses risk rather than stability for the democratic experiment.” Id. at 542–45, 555–57. For
the contrast between the competing narratives of dissent and the pluralist consensus, see Sheldon S.
Wolin, Democracy, Difference, and Re-Cognition, 21 POL. THEORY 464, 464 (1993), observing:
From Roger Williams’s Bloody Tenent (1644) to John Calhoun’s Disquisition,
Margaret Fuller’s Woman in the Nineteenth Century, Booker Washington’s Up from
Slavery, and the Autobiography of Malcolm X, discursive representations of
difference have appeared but until recently have had little effect on the main
conceptual vocabulary or thematic structure of the theoretical literature of American
politics. Instead, from Madison’s Tenth Federalist to the writings of Mary Follett,
Charles Beard, Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and Robert Dahl, those modes of
difference mostly disappeared or were reduced to the status of interests. The result:
on one side, themes of separation, dismemberment, disunion, exploitation,
exclusion, and revenge and, on the other, themes extolling American pluralism as
the distinctive American political achievement and the main reason for the unrivaled
stability of American society and its political system.
To Wolin’s second list, we can add John Rawls, who became for Wolin the paradigmatic thinker of
liberalism’s suppression of difference. See SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY
AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 549 (2004) (noting that the “repressive elements
in Rawls’s liberalism . . . reflect an aversion to social conflict that is in keeping with his elevation of
stability, cooperation, and unity as the fundamental values”).
285
ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS, supra note 5, at 36; see also WILLIAM A. GALSTON,
LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND
PRACTICE 3 (2002) (“Liberalism requires a robust though rebuttable presumption in favor of
individuals and groups leading their lives as they see fit, within a broad range of legitimate variation, in
accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value.”).
286
Inazu, Forgotten Freedom, supra note 15, at 567. See generally MACINTYRE, supra note 267.
287
BAKER, supra note 266, at 134.
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society to assume an “unreasonable” or dissenting posture—dissent is
defined by a group’s refusal to ascribe to state-enforced majoritarian norms
in the particular setting in which it finds itself.288 Successful businessmen,
non-practicing Jewish male college students, and Christian law students all
play a part in “political and cultural diversity.”289 When the state seeks to
inhibit or destroy their way of life, the groups that they inhabit become
forms of “dissident expression.”290 We tolerate these forms of expression
not because we endorse them or seek to emulate them, but because we
recognize the state’s tendencies to dominate and control through the
interpretations and meanings it assigns to a group’s activities.
Facilitating a space for meaningful dissent against suppression by
majoritarian norms is also a fundamentally democratic goal. It protects not
only Christian groups that oppose homosexual conduct but also gay groups
that embrace and embody it.291
As Stephen Carter has argued,
“[d]emocracy needs diversity because democracy advances through
dissent, difference, and dialogue. The idea that the state should . . . create
a set of meanings, [and] try to alter the structure of institutions that do not
match it, is ultimately destructive of democracy because it destroys the
differences that create the dialectic.”292 Beginning from a very different
perspective, William Eskridge arrives at a similar conclusion: “The state
must allow individual nomic communities to flourish or wither as they
may, and the state cannot as a normal matter become the means for the
288

Cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 196 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he status quo of
the college or university is the governing body (trustees or overseers), administrative officers, who
include caretakers, and the police, and the faculty.” (emphasis added)).
289
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
290
Id.
291
See, e.g., Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 2, at 9 (“The genius of the First
Amendment is that it knows no bias. Protections for one minority voice extend to all.”). One
proponent of gay rights has critiqued the “overly formal, inconsequential, empty version of equality”
that underlies the application of antidiscrimination law to the Christian Legal Society. See Joan W.
Howarth, Religious Exercise, Expression, and Association in Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 889, 897
(2009).
292
Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on Legal Theory, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 25, 33 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001). The
importance of protecting difference and dissent is particularly relevant to the “counter-assimilationist”
ideal of religious freedom that allows people “of different religious faiths to maintain their differences
in the face of powerful pressures to conform.” Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1139 (1990). In the context of religious freedom, and in
contrast to his relatively unsympathetic treatment of the Jaycees throughout his Roberts opinion, Justice
Brennan adopted a more communitarian approach. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from
participation in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of
shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals.”); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 524 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A critical function of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of members of minority religions against [the]
quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as
unimportant, because unfamiliar.”).
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triumph of one community over all others.”
The call for greater group autonomy through the right of assembly is
not without limiting principles. The text of the First Amendment offers
one: assemblies must be peaceable.294 Our constitutional, social, and
economic history suggests another: antidiscrimination norms should
typically prevail when applied to commercial entities.295 Other questions
are more difficult to answer. I take up some of them in my forthcoming
book, Liberty’s Refuge.296 Among the most difficult is whether the right of
assembly tolerates racial discrimination by peaceable, noncommercial
groups. Our constitutional history supports a plausible argument that “race
is just different,” that the state’s interest in eliminating racial
discrimination justifies a nearly total ban on racially segregated private
groups.297 As Justice Stewart in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.:
Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment
rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents
of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination
into effective legislation. . . . [W]hen racial discrimination
herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of
slavery.298
For these reasons, we might plausibly treat race differently when
considering the boundaries of group autonomy. I would be quick to do so
as a matter of personal preference—I can think of no racially
discriminatory group to which I attach personal value or worth. But
treating race differently in all dimensions of the private sphere ultimately
293
William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2415 (1997).
294
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the
people peaceably to assemble . . . .”).
295
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 2 (“All noncommercial expressive associations,
regardless of their beliefs, have a constitutionally protected right to control the content of their speech
by excluding those who do not share their essential purposes and beliefs from voting and leadership
roles.” (emphasis added)). Justice O’Connor proposed a similar line. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635–36
(O’Connor, J., concurring). As I suggested earlier in this Article, O’Connor’s requirement that an
association be “predominantly engaged” in expressive activity introduces considerable difficulty to her
conceptual categories, and her conclusion that the Jaycees itself was a commercial association is
problematic. Id. at 635–37. For a clearer example of a commercial association, see City of Dallas v.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24–25 (1989), in which the Supreme Court denied the freedom of association
claim of the owner of a skating rink who challenged a Dallas ordinance restricting admission to “dance
halls” to people between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. As the Court noted, “[t]he hundreds of
teenagers who congregate each night at this particular dance hall are not members of any organized
association; they are patrons of the same business establishment.” Id. at 24.
296
See JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF
ASSEMBLY (forthcoming 2011, Yale University Press).
297
Even here, however, very few people make categorical arguments—the Ku Klux Klan, for
example, is still permitted to tout its racist message.
298
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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undercuts a vision of assembly that protects pluralism and dissent against
state-enforced orthodoxy. We cannot move from the premise that genuine
pluralism matters to an effort to rid ourselves of the groups that we don’t
like.299
On the other hand, the right of assembly will not always trump
competing interests. Courts will have to draw lines and balance interests,
just as they do with the freedom of speech. In my view, the protections for
assembly ought to be constrained when a private group wields so much
power in a given situation—as private groups did in the American South
from the decades following the Civil War to the end of the Civil Rights
Era—that it prevents other groups from meaningfully pursuing their own
visions of pluralism and dissent.300 Seen in this light, assembly is a selflimiting right.301 But as long as private groups do not tip the balance of
power in this way, we should tolerate even those groups that offend our
sensibilities.
Line drawing questions like the permissibility of race-based
discrimination are immensely important. But these difficult questions
should not prevent us from beginning to address the inadequacies of
299

The question of racial discrimination, and specifically discrimination by whites against African
Americans, is one of the most difficult issues confronting any argument for greater group autonomy.
My argument would permit some racially discriminatory groups. It is an argument rooted in social
change and hope in social change—that we are a different society today than we were in 1960 and that
we will continue to hold the ground that has been won. I do not mean to suggest that we have solved
the problem of race. I do argue that in this, as in many other areas of the law, we recognize that the
structural politics today are different. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S.
Ct. 2504, 2516 (2009) (“More than 40 years ago, this Court concluded that ‘exceptional conditions’
prevailing in certain parts of the country justified extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our
federal system. In part due to the success of that legislation, we are now a very different Nation.
Whether conditions continue to justify such legislation is a difficult constitutional question we do not
answer today.” (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966))); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491–92
(1992) (“[W]ith the passage of time, the degree to which racial imbalances continue to represent
vestiges of a constitutional violation may diminish . . .”); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“In the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold
remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future”);
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., Va., 391 U.S. 430, 435–38 (1968) (holding that a school
district may be declared unitary and lacking racial discrimination based on satisfactory performance in
five areas of a school district’s operations).
300
My proposal for assembly differs in this respect from what Andrew Koppelman and Tobias
Wolff have called the “neolibertarian[]” position, which they attribute to an eclectic group of scholars
that includes David Bernstein, Dale Carpenter, Richard Epstein, Michael McConnell, John McGinnis,
Michael Paulsen, Nancy Rosenblum, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin. KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note
6, at xii (quotation marks omitted).
301
A similar rationale underlies the free exercise of religion. A religious group that used its
freedom to establish a theocracy would undermine the principles of the free exercise of religion. The
relationship between the right of assembly and the religion clauses of the First Amendment is a yet
unexplored dimension of constitutional law that might shed some light on the troubled jurisprudence
surrounding “church-state” issues.
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current doctrine. This Article has suggested that the current balance—or
lack of balance—is deeply problematic. Our world is one in which courts
have decided that fraternities cannot exclude women and Christian student
groups cannot exclude those who do not share their religious convictions.
The relevant question today is not whether a constitutional vision that
offers strong protections for pluralism and dissent will be realized (as if
this area of the law could ever reach finality), but whether we ought to
move in that direction.
Some people will be unpersuaded by any constitutional vision that
gives greater protections to dissenting groups, particularly one that limits
the reach of antidiscrimination laws. They will push instead for greater
congruence and less difference. That is the logic underlying the Court’s
decision in Martinez. It surfaces in Justice Kennedy’s belief that a staterun public school “quite properly may conclude that allowing an oath or
belief-affirming requirement, or an outside conduct requirement, could be
divisive for student relations.”302 It is the fundamental tenet of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Truth v. Kent that equates a Christian club’s desire to
limit its members to Christians to invidious discrimination.303
Those who endorse decisions like Martinez and Kent and reject a
constitutional vision that challenges the current approach to protecting
group autonomy need to provide a better justification for the categories of
intimate and expressive association. They should articulate a convincing
constitutional doctrine and ethos that legitimates the jurispathic silencing
of “those who would make a nomos other than that of the state.”304 What
Thomas Emerson observed almost fifty years ago remains true today:
“[T]he constitutional source of ‘the right of association,’ the principles
which underlie it, the extent of its reach, and the standards by which it is to
be applied have never been clearly set forth.”305 The protections for group
autonomy deserve greater respect—and a more coherent jurisprudential
approach—than we have given them thus far.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has called attention to flaws in the Supreme Court’s
categories of intimate and expressive association. It is unlikely that these
categories reflect “well-settled” doctrine.306 But even if they do,
sometimes well-settled doctrine is wrong. The very real constitutional
issues unfolding before us should not be answered by rote invocations of
302

Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2998 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 644–45 (9th Cir. 2008).
Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983).
305
Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 2
(1964).
306
KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at xi.
303
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2010]

UNSETTLING “WELL-SETTLED” LAW OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

207

these ill-formed categories.
The alternative constitutional vision of assembly is not without risk. It
reintroduces a weighing of constitutional values that some would prefer
remain suppressed. It strengthens protections for groups that you and I do
not like. But it also strengthens protections for groups that we care about,
against a state-enforced majoritarianism whose threat we might not
recognize. As Justice Black once wrote: “I do not believe that it can be too
often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly
guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate
or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.”307

307
Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black,
J., dissenting).
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